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ABSTRACT 
The opening of equity markets to foreign investors provides financing opportunities and disrupts the stock ownership structure for firms in these markets. In this paper, we study the effects of equity market opening on firms’ earnings management. Using international firm-level data, we find a significantly positive effect of equity market openness on firms’ income-increasing earnings management. We show that there are substantial heterogeneous effects across industries and firms. The positive effect is more pronounced in industries that are more dependent on external financing and firms that are financially constrained, suggesting that firms’ intrinsic need for equity finance contributes to income-increasing earnings management behaviors. In addition, the effect is weaker in the presence of BigN auditors, indicating the monitoring effect of relatively more reputable auditors. Overall, our results suggest that incentives to attract financing when a country opens its equity market to foreign investors have a detrimental effect on domestic firms’ reporting bias. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past three decades, a growing number of emerging countries have gradually lifted 
controls on their stock markets, allowing foreign investors to directly invest - at least partially - 
in the equity shares of local firms. The opening of markets to foreign capital is an important 
phenomenon in an increasingly globalized world and many studies have examined its implication 
for both the country’s economy and individual firms within the country (e.g. Bekaert et al., 2005; 
Bonfiglioli, 2008; Gupta and Yuan, 2009; Chan and Kwok, 2017). Not surprisingly, the 
availability of foreign capital to domestic equity markets brings significant financing 
opportunities to domestic firms since for many open economies, foreign investors contribute to a 
significant proportion of investment in their capital markets (Kim and Wei, 2002; Edison and 
Warnock, 2003). Financing opportunities are vitally important for managers to promote firm 
growth, especially for firms that are financially constrained (Ayyagari et al., 2008). From an 
information perspective, equity market opening creates disruption to the existing equilibrium in 
that there is now a new investor clientele (i.e., foreign investors) who demand information to 
reduce the adverse selection before investing in the firms within the country (Covrig et al., 2007; 
DeFond et al., 2011). In face of the potential to attract foreign capital and information demand 
from foreign investors, a firm in a country that opens its equity markets faces an important 
decision as to how to report its earnings, especially when it can exercise discretion to manage the 
reported numbers (Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Leuz et al., 2003).  
On one hand, the desire to appear as a more attractive investment might lead firms to 
engage in upward earnings management, since firms that look more profitable are generally 
perceived as having more growth opportunities and better investments (Haugen and Baker, 1996). 
In other words, equity market openness could give rise to incentives of upward earnings 
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management for the firm to exploit these growth or investment opportunities, especially when 
the existing shareholder group wishes to impress the prospective foreign shareholder group with 
the firm's past performance (Dye, 1988). On the other hand, one might expect equity market 
opening to result in less upward earnings management, since inflating current earnings could 
lead to significant pressure to meet elevated market expectations of future earnings and prior 
studies have documented significant problems, e.g., pressure to commit fraud and significant 
stock price declines, that could result from failure to meet earnings expectations (Graham et al., 
2005). This problem is exacerbated by future reversals of upward managed earnings putting 
downward pressure on earnings in the future (DeFond and Park, 2001). Consequently, whether 
firms engage in upward earnings management after equity market opening remains an open, 
empirical question; there is also likely to be significant heterogeneity in this relation depending 
on country-, industry- and firm-level conditions. 
Our paper provides evidence on how and to what extent equity market openness 
influences firms’ earnings management. We exploit shocks to the availability of external equity 
finance and examine the impact of equity market openness on firms’ earnings management 
behavior of 64 countries during the period from 1989 to 2014.1 The use of shocks helps to 
alleviate concerns of endogeneity. For example, endogeneity might arise because external 
financing and earnings management are corporate decisions that could be arise because of some 
underlying firm characteristic such as growth/investment opportunity and corporate governance 
mechanisms. 2  There could also be reverse causality because actual or expected earnings 
                                                     1 Tracing back to Henry, 2000, several similar but different concepts related to equity market openness appeared in the literature, for example, financial openness, financial integration, equity (stock) market liberalization. Here we focus on the concept of formal regulatory openness in the equity market that has made domestic equity shares become officially available to foreign investors. 2 There are several firm characteristics that may be difficult to measure or fully control for using publicly available data. For example, several studies find well-designed corporate governance arrangements can constrain earnings 
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management could affect the availability of external financing. There is significant evidence that 
potential and current investors, as well other stakeholders, expect/anticipate earnings 
management (e.g., Erickson and Wang, 1999; Burgstahler and Eames, 2003; Graham et al., 2005; 
Shivakumar, 2000). 
We find that equity market openness is significantly positively related to firms’ upward 
earnings management. This result is not driven by cross-country differences in gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth and is independent of concurrent trade liberalizations. Furthermore, the 
earnings management finding is robust to a variety of alternative specifications, and is 
concentrated in the year of equity market opening. We further show that equity market openness 
increases discretionary accruals disproportionately more in sectors dependent on external finance 
and in R&D intensive sectors, indicating that firm’s external financing dependence play an 
important role in managers’ decision making. 
To the best of our knowledge, little research has been done in examining the relationship 
between the arrival of external financing opportunities and firms’ financial reporting using 
international data, especially under the setting of equity market openness. Only a few papers 
examine such a relationship in a similar setting by mainly looking at country level aggregate 
measures, for example, Bae et al. (2006) argue that stock market liberalization decreases firms’ 
earnings smoothing and loss avoidance; Gaio (2010) documents that financial globalization 
makes firm characteristics more compelling and institutional characteristics less vital in 
explaining earnings quality worldwide. These studies are, however, limited to the fact that most 
of them neglect the time-varying and incremental opening nature of capital markets and they do 
not investigate this very specific dimension of accrual-based earnings management. In particular, 
                                                                                                                                                                           management (e.g., Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Klein, 2002; Warfield et al., 1995) and there is a large literature that examines how such mechanisms affect external financing (e.g., Doidge et al., 2007; Francis et al., 2005b; Williamson, 1988). 
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these studies show long-term improvement in the information environment following equity 
market openings, while we investigate the short-term deterioration. In addition, they do not 
exploit sectoral and/or firm-level variations of the impact of equity market openness.  
We use international firm level data and exploit the sample-wide variation of firms’ 
earnings management behavior in the process of equity market opening by conducting a 
generalized difference-in-difference test. Specifically, we examine whether firms engage in 
income-increasing earnings management during the period of their countries opening their equity 
markets to foreign entities compared to other periods. We calculate difference between the firms’ 
discretionary accruals during the year in which a country lifts controls on its equity market and 
those in other years, and compare it to the same difference in countries not implementing such a 
regulatory change during that year. As discussed in Larrain (2014), the use of a sample including 
countries opening at different moments of time allows us to conduct a generalized difference-in-
difference test in a setting with multiple-treatment-groups and multiple-sample-periods. 
According to this procedure of utilizing staggered reforms, the “control” group at a certain year 
includes both the countries that have already opened and those that have yet not opened their 
equity markets.   
Sample-wide, we find income-increasing earnings management in the year of relaxation 
in country-level equity market controls, and our estimates of earnings management suggest that 
on average discretionary accruals contribute to more than 1%-point increase in return on assets 
(ROA) during these periods for sample firms. Our baseline test includes several controls that 
should enhance our confidence to separate earnings management from the real economic output. 
In addition, we perform several robustness tests that help alleviate the concern of bias in 
measurements and estimation procedures. This finding corresponds to prior literature, that 
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financing opportunities and information asymmetry between investors and managers tend to 
induce firms to engage in earnings management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Teoh et al., 1998). 
In further analyses, we examine cross-sectional variations in the average effect of equity 
market openness on firms’ earnings management behavior. First, we explore within-country 
cross-sectoral variation in industry characteristics. The basic idea of this analysis is that, as Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) point out, the importance of the availability of outside capital increases with 
an industry’s dependence on external finance. If the equity market is a key factor allowing 
financing constraints to be relaxed, then a sudden increase in the capital availability in the market 
should have a disproportionately impact on the sectors that have originally been constrained by 
the limited capital in the market due to their dependence on external finance. Therefore, external 
financing need could serve as the main incentives for earnings management in our setting and we 
consider firms’ external finance dependence from various angles. Consistent with the stronger 
dependence on external finance resulting in greater pressure on managers in exploiting financing 
opportunities, we find that earnings management is more pronounced in sectors which are highly 
dependent on external finance. The strong positive effect among firms that are more financially 
constrained further confirms our above conjecture.  
Second, we undertake a cross-sectional test to see whether the effect differs in firms with 
different stakeholders. Previous literature document that earnings management is less severe 
among firms audited by BigN audit firms (see Dechow et al. (2010) for an overview). We find 
evidence that firms with BigN auditor3 exhibit less income-increasing earnings management, in 
our case when their domestic market opens up to foreign investors. This result suggests the 
monitoring effect of higher quality auditors and the importance of firm-level supervision in 
constraining financial misreporting. Next we introduce the interaction term with analyst coverage 
                                                     3 Here we refer to firms that have primary auditors coded from 01 to 08 in Capital IQ Global. 
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and institutional ownership (especially domestic institutional investor ownership) separately into 
equation to see what kind of role these stakeholders are playing in our setting. We show that the 
results on the interaction terms are statistically significant and positive, suggesting that these two 
parties are putting pressure on firm managers to enhance the visibility of the firm to prospective 
investors, rather than their monitoring role dominant during the opening periods. 
In addition, we explore whether institutional quality matters for firms’ financial reporting 
behavior. We show that institutions with stronger public enforcement tend to discourage firms 
from engaging earnings management, while economies with higher level of corruption tend to 
encourage firms’ earnings management behaviors. Although we do not find significant results 
using financial reporting specific legal enforcement, our overall country-level cross-sectional 
tests indicate the important role of legal environment in disciplining firms’ financial reporting 
behaviors. 
Our paper contributes to several aspects of the literature. This paper is related to the 
literature on external financing and disclosure. There exists an early literature that treats 
disclosure is exogenous and examines the effect on external financing (La Porta et al., 1997, 
1999). A more recent literature examines how changes in disclosure regulation, such as IFRS 
adoption, affect external financing (DeFond et al., 2011; Hong et al., 2014). Previous studies 
have also examined how external financing affects firm’s disclosure. In particular, some papers 
have examined the earnings management behavior of firms that have actually engaged in IPOs or 
SEOs (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Ertimur et al., 2017; Rangan, 1998; Shivakumar, 2000; 
Teoh et al., 1998). Our paper complements and contrasts with these papers as follows. First, 
because prior papers focus on successful external financing, it is difficult to conclude whether 
firms typically engage in earnings management in response to external financing opportunities. It 
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is possible that firms, on average, do not engage in upward earnings management but the firms 
with successful IPOs or SEOs are those that have successfully misled investors with upward 
earnings management4. For example, in contrast to prior studies, Ertimur et al. (2017) find no 
evidence of income-increasing earnings management in anticipation of the IPO. Second, we are 
able to rely on shocks to the equity markets of countries to better identify how the arrival of 
financing opportunities affect managers’ reporting behavior in respond to changes in the 
financing environment. To further identify the effect of financing opportunities, we follow the 
literature on equity market opening and carry out difference-in-difference tests based on 
industry-level equity market dependence (Manova, 2008; Gupta and Yuan, 2009; Moshirian et 
al., 2015). Based on these tests, we are able to conclude that firms in industries that depend more 
on equity financing engage in upward earnings management when countries open up their equity 
markets. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature 
and presents our hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the data and the research design. 
Section 4 presents the main empirical result and robustness checks. Section 5 presents the cross-
sectional estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Background 
The past three decades have witnessed a growing trend of equity market opening in many 
emerging economies. Opening an equity market is a decision made by a country’s government 
with other countries to free the movement of capital in that country’s equity market (Henry, 
                                                     4 In other words, these papers do not directly examine the effect of financing opportunities on earnings management. There is also contention as to whether the earnings management around actual offerings is due to issuers’ intention to mislead investors (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998) or issuers’ rational response to anticipated market behavior at offering announcements (Shivakumar, 2000). 
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2000). Equity market openness brings significant financing opportunities to domestic firms. 
According to Rajan and Zingales (2003), the cross-border capital movement is high both at the 
beginning and the end of the twentieth century for most countries. This phenomenon is 
continuously growing over the recent years until 2008. The global crisis has sparked interest in 
the relationship between international capital flows and domestic financial crises in both 
academia and politics (Mendoza and Quadrini, 2010).  
Despite a long history, there remains a large body of literature in the international finance 
literature debating about the costs and benefits of financial globalization (regulatory openness)5. 
It is commonly agreed that financial globalization has dual effects: on the one hand, it tends to 
lessen the financing constraints, contributing to higher investment and growth; on the other hand, 
it encourages risk-taking, often resulting in severe consequences such as financial fragility or 
even financial crises (Ranciere et al., 2006). Although strong theoretical presumption asserts 
financial globalization should be welfare improving, many researchers have noticed that the 
occurrence of domestic financial crises was often accompanied by financial globalization (see 
Bonfiglioli (2008) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)). In line with this, Broner and Ventura 
(2016)’s model shows that the level of development and the quality of institutions determine how 
financial globalization affects a variety of domestic outcomes.  
The empirical findings and theoretical conclusions do not seem to be very consistent over 
the debate on the desirability of capital controls. In recent empirical works, Bekaert et al. (2005) 
argue that equity market liberalizations lead to significant increase in real economic growth. 
Mitton (2006) shows that firms with stocks that are open to foreign investors experience better 
operating performance compared to other domestic firms. Using a broader indicator, Larrain and 
Stumpner (2017) find that capital account openness improves resource allocation by enabling 
                                                     5 See Henry (2007) and Kose et al. (2009) for a survey of the literature. 
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financially constrained firms to raise more capital and produce more efficiently. Theoretical 
predictions, however, argue the other way around. For example, Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
examine the politics of financial development in the twentieth century model. They develop a 
theory that shows that when an economy allows both cross-border trade and capital flows, 
opposition to financial development will be most muted and development will flourish. Using an 
open-economy model, Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) also show that financial integration played 
an important role in the recent financial crises by leading to a sharp rise in net credit and asset 
price spillovers. Therefore, a thorough exploration of benefits and/or costs brought by financial 
globalization is rather intriguing and economically important. 
There is, however, one obstacle faced by almost all researchers who study financial 
liberalization. For most of the countries, although Bekaert et al. (2011) provide evidence that 
equity market openness is the main determinant of variations in equity market segmentations, it 
is hard to pinpoint the exact opening dates because equity market openness per se is typically a 
gradual process, not a one-time event. For example, the Philippine government signed Foreign 
Investment Act into law in June, 1991, which removed all restrictions on foreign investment over 
a period of three years (Bekaert et al., 2005); for the Korean stock market, starting from July 
1992, foreigners were subject to a partial opening of its stock market and only allowed to own up 
to 10% of domestically listed firms until May 1998, a subsequent liberalization happened with 
100% change in foreign ownership ceilings (Kim and Wei, 2002). Besides, equity market 
opening is often concurrent with other economic reforms which make it harder to disentangle the 
effects explicitly brought by liberalizations. 
In our study, we build upon and extend Bekaert et al. (2005)’s official liberalization 
indicators by using two kinds of equity market openness indicator simultaneously – the binary 
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and continuous measurements - to study how firms respond to the financing opportunities 
brought by financial liberalization. Our baseline accruals specification is expanded by controls 
for other macroeconomic reforms such as trade openness and International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) adoption. As an exploration of benefits and/or costs of financial liberalization, 
we investigate whether firms exhibit income-increasing earnings management behaviors during 
the equity market opening periods. Furthermore, we discuss cross-sectional predictions arising 
from factors associated with earnings management around opening episodes. 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
   According to the previous literature, firms’ capital raising activities are generally 
associated with earnings management6.  
On one hand, firms that are more profitable are generally perceived as having more 
growth opportunities and better investments (Haugen and Baker, 1996). Hence, firms, in face of 
the potential to attract foreign capital, have incentives to managing its earnings upwards to attract 
more capital and/or raise new capital at lower cost (i.e., sell new shares at higher prices). For 
example, in an investigation of why corporate managers misstate financial statements, Efendi et 
al. (2007) find that US firms that raise new equity or debt finance are more likely to have 
misstatements.  
Even if no new capital were involved, there would still be an incentive to manage 
earnings upwards to the extent it enables existing shareholders to sell their shares to foreign 
investors at higher prices if there is alignment of interests between existing shareholders and the 
managers (who themselves might be existing shareholders) of the firm (Dye, 1988).7 Fischer and 
                                                     6 See Dechow et al. (2010) for an overview. 7 Dye (1998, p. 197) notes that “The demand for earnings management derives from one shareholder generation’s attempt to impress the next generation with the firm’s past performance.”  
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Verrecchia (2000) demonstrate theoretically that the ex-ante benefit from biasing the report is 
positive if there is sufficient uncertainty about the manager's reporting objective. In the case of 
equity market opening, we argue that many foreign investors who are interested in investing in a 
country’s firms after equity market opening, face significant uncertainty related to manager’s 
reporting objective(s) and more generally, reporting behavior. Hence, the desire to appear as a 
more attractive investment might lead firms to engage in upward earnings management.  
On the other hand, inflating current earnings could lead to significant pressure to meet 
elevated market expectations of future earnings and prior studies have documented significant 
problems, e.g., pressure to commit fraud and significant stock price declines that could result 
from failure to meet earnings expectations (Graham et al., 2005). This problem is exacerbated by 
future reversals of upward managed earnings putting downward pressure on earnings in the 
future (DeFond and Park, 2001). Prior literature have documented that attempts to hide bad news 
increases the likelihood of stock price crashes due to the revelation of previously hidden bad 
news (Hutton et al., 2009; Kim and Zhang, 2016). Foreign investors, especially foreign 
institutional investors, have the potential to constrain managers from manipulating firm 
performance, as foreign investors require are more likely to invest in firms with fewer 
information problems (see Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Leuz et al., 2009).8 Equity market opening 
might also lead to better corporate governance because foreign investors might be more 
sophisticated than domestic investors, especially in the developing countries that are opening 
their equity markets, and pay more attention to corporate governance. Aggarwal et al. (2011) 
find that firm-level governance is positively associated with international institutional investment. 
They also document that firms with higher international institutional ownership are more likely 
                                                     8 There is some evidence, including in the international setting, that being more aggressive in reporting earnings is associated with a higher cost of capital (Lara et al., 2011; Li, 2015). 
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to terminate poorly performing Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Hence, one might expect 
equity market opening to result in less upward earnings management. 
In sum, the incentives to “dress up” to sell shares to foreign investors suggest that equity 
market opening will lead to relatively more upward earnings management, whereas the 
consequences of better corporate governance with more foreign ownership will lead to relatively 
less upward earnings management. Whether firms engage in upward earnings management after 
equity market opening is ultimately an empirical question. There is also likely to be significant 
heterogeneity in this relation depending on country-, industry- and firm-level conditions.  
Despite the tension in the hypothesis on how equity market opening affects earnings 
management, for ease of exposition (especially given our subsequent additional analyses), we 
state our hypothesis in the alternative form. Specifically, our first hypothesis is: 
H1: When a country lift capital controls on its equity market, firms engage in upward 
earning management due to incentives to attract external equity financing. 
Previous studies document the differential impact of macroeconomic conditions on 
sectoral growth by focusing on the difference in external finance dependence. For example, 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that external finance dependent sectors grow faster in a well-
developed financial system due to the relaxation of credit constraints; Manova (2008) finds that 
equity market liberalizations have more positive effect on exports in industries that are 
financially fragile and demand more outside finance.  Similarly, if equity market is the key factor 
allowing credit constraints to be relaxed, then a sudden increase in the capital availability in the 
market should have a disproportionately slack impact on the sectors that have originally suffered 
due to their dependence on equity finance. Therefore, for firms from sectors that are more 
dependent on equity financing, the capital market consequences of income-increasing earnings 
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management could enhance the benefits the firm receives in the form of capital accumulation 
from outside investors. Accordingly, we predict firms that are more dependent on external equity 
financing during the opening periods face stronger incentives to engage in income-increasing 
earnings management.  
H2: The positive effect of equity market openness on upward earnings management is 
greater for industries that are more dependent on external equity financing. 
Auditors are hypothesized to be an element of earnings quality due to their role in 
alleviating intended or unintended financial misreporting. According to DeAngelo (1981), the 
ability of auditors is a function of the auditor’s capability to detect a substantial misstatement and 
appropriately deal with it. With few exceptions, prior literature document that firms with BigN 
auditors have significantly lower discretionary accruals than firms with non-BigN auditors (see 
Dechow et al. (2010) for an overview), suggesting information-based monitoring effect BigN 
auditors on earnings quality. Conversely, the role of analysts and institutional ownership in 
constraining firms from financial misreporting is mixed in the literature. Specifically in our 
setting, these firm-level stakeholders might put pressure on firm managers to enhance the 
visibility of the firm to the prospective investors, especially foreign investors, so that they can 
benefit from a higher future stock price. Collectively, we predict that income-increasing earnings 
management will be mitigated for firms with BigN auditors but exacerbated for firms with higher 
analyst following and institutional ownership during equity market opening periods. 
H3: The positive effect of equity market openness on upward earnings management is 
weaker in firms audited by BigN audit firms, but stronger with high analyst coverage and 
institutional ownership.  
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Previous literature document that firms’ legal environment matters for their financial 
reporting behaviors, e.g. Leuz et al. (2003), Gaio (2010), Francis et al. (2005b). On one hand, 
economies with stronger legal environment would constrain firms from misdoing by enforcing 
tough penalties and enforcement. On the other hand, institutions with higher level of corruption 
would induce more incentives for firms to conduct misreporting when they are faced with 
external financing opportunities. Hence, we expect firms from economies with strong public 
enforcement would do less financial misreporting, while firms from institutions that are with 
higher level of corruptions in the society would be encouraged to do more earnings management. 
H4: The positive effect of equity market openness on upward earnings management is 
smaller in countries with strong legal enforcement, but larger in economies with higher level of 
corruption.  
3. Data and Research Design  
3.1 Sample selection 
We collect firm-level financial data from Capital IQ Global. The sample represents all 
firms covered by Capital IQ Global with necessary data for our empirical analyses. Like the 
previous literature Yu (2008), He et al. (2017) and Lo et al. (2017), we exclude firms from 
financial sectors (SIC 2-digit: 60-69) and restrict firms to have necessary data to compute the 
accruals, operating cash flows and firm-level control variables. Firms’ exchange markets are 
used as the country indicator in the empirical analyses 9 ; therefore we exclude firm-year 
observations with missing exchange codes. We obtain country-level variables that represent 
formal institutions and financial development from World Bank Development Indicators and 
Penn World Table. We calculate sectoral indexes using United States data from Capital IQ North 
                                                     9 Some of the exchange codes correspond to multiple country codes, in that case we use firms’ headquarter country code instead. 
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America. Our final sample consists of 200,460 firm-year observations for 26,187 non-financial 
firms from 64 countries from 1989 to 2014.  
3.1.1 Equity market openness 
The indicator variable of equity market openness is perhaps the most important variable in 
our paper. We use Opening, a de jure binary indicator that equals to 1 if a firm is from a country 
in the year of official equity market opening, and zero otherwise, as the proxy for equity market 
openness. The opening year is the official liberalization year from Bekaert et al. (2005), 
supplemented by the year of becoming an European Union (EU) member from Bekaert et al. 
(2013) and the year of stock market liberalization in China from Chan and Kwok (2017). The 
Bekaert et al. (2005) liberalization measure is based on detailed chronology of important 
financial, economic and political events in many emerging countries and has been widely used in 
existing literature, e.g. Manova (2008), Bae et al. (2008), Bae and Goyal (2010). The reason why 
we use the EU membership as a large jump in equity market openness is that the liberalization 
year for these European countries is not included in Bekaert et al. (2005), but Bekaert et al. (2013) 
show that membership in the EU has economically significantly contributed to convergence of 
discount rate and expected earnings growth across EU countries. Since the EU has been set out 
to free the movement of capital together with other resources within the union countries and 
financial integration is the long-term goal of regulatory openness, this evidence gives us more 
confidence in using EU membership as an opening indicator in the analyses. 
3.1.2 Sectoral Indexes 
We use three measures of external finance dependence that are calculated at the industry 
level. In particular, they are calculated using US data from Capital IQ North America: the 
external equity finance dependence and the investment intensity following Rajan and Zingales 
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(1998), the R&D intensity following Li (2011). The dependence on external finance, is defined 
as the ratio of capital expenditures not financed by operating cash flows to total capital 
expenditures; the investment intensity, an alternative measure of external finance dependence, is 
the ratio of capital expenditures to net property plant and equipment; the R&D intensity, which 
measures the R&D activities, is the ratio of R&D spending to total assets. All these measures are 
calculated as the industry median of United States publicly listed firms.  
Rajan and Zingales (1998) point out that data on the actual use of external financing is 
typically not available; we have to find some other ways to identify an industry's dependence on 
external financing. The assumption is that there is a technological reason why the dependence on 
external finance varies across industries, and these differences persist across countries so that we 
can use sectoral external finance dependence indexes identified in the United States as 
representatives across other countries. Since Brown et al. (2009)’s finding suggest that external 
equity is one of the most important sources for firms to finance R&D, we also include R&D 
intensity as an alternative proxy for external equity finance dependence.  
As for the benefit of using US sectoral indexes, as stated in Moshirian et al. (2015), the use 
of the United States data helps to alleviate the reverse causality concern that a country’s financial 
liberalization is driven by its industrial growth or innovation activities and creates enough 
country-industry variation that allows us to examine the differential effect among different 
industries and institutions. Therefore, this methodology has been widely employed in cross-
country studies, e.g., Larrain (2014), Manova (2012). 
3.1.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of table 1 shows the countries where we are able to identify equity market opening 
status. In total, the sample covers 64 different jurisdictions all over the world. Among countries 
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opening during our sample period, China, which opened near the end of our sample, is the largest 
with about 10% of the firm-years in our sample, followed by India, which opened in the 
beginning of our sample period, with about 8% of the firm-years the sample. We acknowledge 
that some of the opening events identified from Bekaert et al. (2005) are not covered by the 
observations in Capital IQ Global10 due to data availability. We also supplement our sample by 
including economies that have already opened and those that have never opened equity market 
during the sample period to provide more nonevent observations to model parameters. Panel B of 
table 1 shows distribution of the sample by year. There is a clear time trend in the number of 
firm-year observations as stock markets and coverage have expanded during our sample period. 
The main effects of this are expected to be absorbed by time fixed effects in our model. In 
robustness tests we also include firm fixed effects to compare the same firms during and outside 
the opening year. 
Panel A of table 2 reports the means and medians of the earnings management measures, 
equity market openness index, as well as firm- and country-level characteristics for observations 
in our sample. The mean and median of working capital accruals are 0.014 and 0.005, on average, 
which is comparable to those reported in the previous literature (e.g., He et al., 2017; Godsell et 
al., 2017). The mean of equity market openness index Opening is 0.012, suggesting that the 
occurrence of equity market opening during the sample period is relatively rare and only comes 
from the liberalizing countries (the mean value is 0.035). As for the firm-level variables, the 
mean and median of firm size is 4.742 and 4.678 respectively; the mean value of sales growth is 
14.5%; the average leverage ratio (book leverage) is 24.8%. For the opening sample, except for 
the significant difference in accruals and openness degree, many other variables are on average 
                                                     10 Which is why we support our findings by using a continuous measure of equity market restrictions as well (based on Fernández et al. (2016)). More details about this measure please refer to Footnote 12. 
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reasonably comparable to those in other samples, with some exceptions for the country-level 
characteristics like financial development and trade openness11. We control for all these variables 
in our empirical tests. 
Panel B of table 2 shows the univariate analysis of accruals during the opening year and 
other years. The t-test results show that total accruals and working capital accruals are 
significantly higher for firms during the equity market opening year than other periods. This test 
provides preliminary evidence that firms exhibit income-increasing earning management during 
equity market opening periods. 
3.2 Research Design 
    We employ the cross-sectional accruals model introduced in Francis et al. (2005a), 
which combines the elements of Jones (1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals models, 
to obtain the discretionary accruals. To control for firm characteristics that may also affect firms’ 
accruals choices, we include proxies for firm size, leverage, growth, operating volatility, and net 
operating assets. We also include time-varying country-level control variables in the regression 
following Larrain and Stumpner (2017) and Chan et al. (2015). Similar to Godsell et al. (2017), 
we do not proceed in two stages - with a first stage identifying discretionary accruals and a 
second stage explaining variation in discretionary accruals - since Chen et al. (2017) point out 
that when there are correlations between explanatory variables, usage of two-step regression 
procedures could lead to biased coefficient estimates and standard errors, resulting in Type I and 
Type II errors. They suggest single-step procedures as the most basic solution to this problem. 
Specifically, we initially estimate the following equation: 
                                                     11 Which is also reasonable since most open equity markets are highly financially developed and have open trade markets as well (Manova, 2008). 
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ܣܥܥ௜,௝,௖,௧ = α଴ + ߚଵ1/ܶ݋ݐܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜,௝,௖,௧ିଵ + ߚଶܲܲܧ௜,௝,௖,௧+ ߚଷ൫Δܴ݁ݒ௜,௝,௖,௧ − Δܣܴ௜,௝,௖,௧൯
+ ߚସܥܨܱ௜,௝,௖,௧ିଵ + ߚହܥܨ ௜ܱ,௝,௖,௧ + ߚ଺ܥܨ ௜ܱ,௝,௖,௧ାଵ + ߚ଻ܱ݌݁݊௖,௧ + ߚ଼ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௝,௖,௧
+ ߚଽܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௝,௖,௧ + ߚଵ଴ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௝,௖,௧ + ߚଵଵܵݐ݀(݈ܵܽ݁ݏ)௜,௝,௖,௧ + ߚଵଶܱܰܣ௜,௝,௖,௧ିଵ
+ ߚଵଷܩܦ ௖ܲ,௧ + ߚଵସܫ݂݈݊ܽݐ݅݋݊௖,௧ + ߚଵହܶݎܱܽ݀݁݌݁݊௖,௧ + ߚଵ଺ܩ݋ݒܧݔ݌௖,௧
+ ߚଵ଻ܨ݅݊ܦ݁ݒ௖,௧ + ߚଵ଼ܫܨܴܵ_ܲ݋ݏݐ௖,௧ + ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ
+  ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ +  ܻ݁ܽݎ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ + ߭௜,௝,௖,௧ 
(1) 
where ܣܥܥ௜,௝,௖,௧  is working capital accruals or total accruals. WC_ACC is working capital 
accruals, measured as the change in current assets minus the change in current liabilities minus 
the change in cash plus change in short-term debt (change in cash and short-term debt are 
included in the calculate to adjust for current liabilities used for financing). TOT_ACC is total 
accruals and is measured as working capital accruals minus depreciation expense. 1/TotAssets is 
the inverse of total assets in year t-1. CFOt−1,t,t+1 are cash flows from operations in year t−1, t, 
and t+1 scaled by total assets in year t-1. PPE is net property, plant, and equipment, scaled by 
total assets in year t-1. ∆REV-∆AR is the change in sales minus the change in accounts receivable, 
scaled by total assets in year t-1. Open is one of the measures for equity market openness. Size is 
the natural logarithm of total sales revenue. Leverage is book leverage, defined as long-term debt 
plus the current portion of long-term debt, scaled by total assets. Growth is sales growth, 
calculated as sales growth from year t − 1 to t. Std(sales) is operating volatility, defined as the 
standard deviation of sales over the past three years, that is, t, t − 1, t − 2. NOA is net operating 
assets, calculated as the sum of shareholders equity and interest-bearing debt, minus cash assets, 
scaled by sales. GDP Growth is the percentage change in real GDP for a given country over the 
year. Inflation is the rate of price change in the economy as measured by the annual growth rate 
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of the GDP implicit deflator. TradeOpen is trade openness measured as the sum of imports and 
exports of goods and services divided by GDP. GovExp is general government final consumption 
expenditure scaled by GDP. FinDev is financial development measured as private credit to GDP. 
IFRS_Post is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the country is on or after the year of IFRS adoption, 
and zero otherwise. Following prior literature, all firm-level control variables are winsorized by 
the whole sample at 1% and 99% to eliminate the possible influence of outliers. 
Based on the previous studies, we expect the coefficients of sales growth and lead and 
lagged cash flow from operations to be positive and significant, while the coefficients of present 
cash flows to be negative and significant. PPE is expected to be negatively related to total 
accruals due to the fact that depreciation charges partially come from fixed assets. Country and 
industry fixed effects are included to capture any systematic variances in accruals across our 
sample countries or industries. Year fixed effects are also included in the model to adjust for any 
time trend exhibited by our sample firms during the sample period. We cluster standard errors by 
country to address any correlations across time or firms in the same country. In robustness 
checks, we also substitute country and industry fixed effects with firm fixed effects to control for 
firm-specific and time-invariant characteristics. Our primary empirical predictions are that 
discretionary accruals will be significantly positive during the equity market opening periods. 
Specifically, we expect to see ߚ଻ in equation (1) to be positive and significant.   
4. Equity market openness and earnings management 
4.1 Main evidence 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the regression based on Equation (1), which 
examines sample-wide earnings management in periods around the opening of equity markets. 
The first two columns report results of using the binary indicator of equity market openness. 
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Country-, industry-, and year- fixed effects are included in the regressions. Standard errors are 
robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the country level. In the last two columns we 
repeat these tests by replacing country and industry fixed effects with firm fixed effects. 
Consistent with H1, the coefficients of equity market openness on both total accruals and 
working capital accruals in all four columns are positive and statistically significant. On average, 
discretionary accruals increase reported ROA by more than 1% point in the event year. The 
control variables have predicted signs and are in general consistent with the prior literature. 
Specifically, accruals are positively related to sales growth, lead and lag cash flows from 
operations and negatively related to present cash flows. Net property, plant and equipment are 
negatively related to total accruals because of its contribution to the depreciation expense. For 
firm characteristics, on average, accruals increase with firm size, leverage, and growth, while 
decrease with operating volatility and net operating assets. For country level economic indicators, 
accruals are positively related to inflation, trade openness, and negatively related to government 
expenditure and financial development. The results correspond to previous findings that 
financially developed economies embrace higher earnings quality compared to less developed 
ones (Leuz et al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006). Meanwhile, it suggests that the positive effect 
of equity market openness on earnings management remains robust even after controlling for the 
economic development and other time-varying country level characteristics. Results are similar, 
but with a bit smaller effect sizes, when including firm fixed effects. 
Collectively, we show that firms from countries that are opening their equity market 
exhibit income-increasing earnings management during the official opening periods12. This is 
                                                     12 In our un-tabulated results, we investigate the robustness of the liberalization effect by using an alternative measure of financial liberalization: the change in the Equity market restrictions index from Fernández et al. (2016). This measure is a continuous variable which captures the regulatory change in the equity market restrictions based 
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consistent with our main hypothesis H1. When equity market opens to foreign investors, it brings 
financing opportunities to domestic firms, and it is hard to argue that theses financing 
opportunities could be easily influenced by individual firms’ decisions. Such external financing 
incentives will induce firms exhibiting upward earnings management if firms want to impress the 
potential investors with past performance. Thus, equity market opening will have a positive 
effect on firms’ upward earnings management. 
4.2 Robustness tests 
Next, we conduct several robustness tests for our main regression. First, we investigate the 
timing of the earnings management using our Opening variable. Instead of just an indicator for 
the opening year, we also include indicators for the year before the opening and the year after. 
We also present our results based on two samples, the liberalizing sample with only countries 
that had equity market liberalization during our sample period, and the full sample with both 
open markets and that are never opened during our sample period in the sample. Consistent with 
the opening driving the earnings management, rather than a generic time trend, we find no 
consistent evidence of upward earnings management in the year before the opening. Although 
some of them are positive and significant with country and industry fixed effects, but these 
results for the year before and after are not significant or even negatively significant after 
including firm fixed effects. We do find some evidence that firms are associated with positive 
discretionary accruals after opening, this could be consistent with a desire to keep earnings high 
during/soon after an equity issuance.  
Second, we want to see whether our results are robust to the removal of countries that have 
open markets or never opened during our sample periods. Panel B of table 4 shows the 
                                                                                                                                                                           on information from Annual Report of Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions published by the IMF for the period 1995-2013. The estimation results are similar to what we have obtained here. 
23  
estimation results based on the sample only including economies that have an opening event 
during our sample period. Results are consistent with the main findings in Table 3, with similar 
effect sizes and significance. Results using firm fixed effects are slightly stronger in this 
restricted sample. 
Third, Collins et al. (2017) argue that firm growth plays an important role in explaining the 
discretionary accruals and the inclusion of growth quintiles in the Modified Jones-type models 
exhibit high power in explaining the non-linear relationship between growth and firm 
performance. Therefore, in order to address the concern that our results may be naturally driven 
by firms’ growth, we control for three firm growth measures as suggested in Collins et al. (2017). 
We calculate current period growth proxy ROA as the net income scaled by year t-1 total assets 
for firm i during the current year (i.e., NIi,t/TotAssetsi,t-1); backward-looking growth proxy SG as 
the yearly differenced sales growth (i.e., (Salesi,t- Salesi,t-1)/Salesi,t-1); forward-looking growth 
proxy MB as the market-to-book ratio for equity at the beginning of the year (i.e., Market 
Valuei,t-1/Book Valuei,t-1). Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 






+ ߛܺ௜,௝,௖,௧ + ߜܺ௖,௧ + ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ
+  ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ +  ܻ݁ܽݎ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ + ߭௜,௝,௖,௧ 
 (2) 
where ܣܥܥ௜,௝,௖,௧  is working capital accruals or total accruals. Open is the indicator for equity 
market openness. The dummy variable ܵܩ_ܦݑ݉௞,௜,௝,௖,௧ takes the value 1 if SG from year t-1 to t 
for firm i belongs to the kth quintile of SG in the sample, and 0 otherwise. To avoid introducing 
perfect multicollinearity, we include dummy variables only for quintile k = 1, 2, 4, and 5. 
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Quintile dummy variables for ROA and MB have similar definitions. X represents all other 
variables that are detailed in equation (1). 
          The estimation results are shown in Table 4 Panel C. Like Collins et al. (2017), our results 
show that after controlling for firm growth, the explanatory power of our model to discretionary 
accruals increases by about 4%. The coefficients on the different quintiles of growth measures 
are indeed different as prior studies document. Moving from ROA quintile 1 to 5, the 
coefficients changes from significant negative to significant positive, suggesting the non-linear 
relationship between firms’ current growth and discretionary accruals. Similar pattern shows up 
on SG quintiles as well. As for the coefficients of MB, the pattern is the opposite: moving from 
MB quintile 1 to 5, the coefficients changes from significant positive to negative (although we 
only find significance in some of the results). After controlling all these firm level growth 
measures, the coefficients of our main independent variable Opening are still significantly 
positive, and robust to both firm and country, industry fixed effects.  
Taken together, through these alternative specifications, we are more confident to conclude 
that in general, equity market openness is related to firms’ upward earnings management. This 
result is not sensitive to the usage of different measurements of the equity market openness, nor 
in different sample size or the estimation with extra firm growth controls and firm fixed effects. 
5. Cross-sectional variations on the equity market openness and earnings management 
After establishing overall evidence of upward earnings management during opening 
periods, we next explore a couple of context-specific factors that we predict would generate 
cross-sectional variation in the incentives for firms’ upward earnings management in our setting. 
In our first cross-sectional test, we examine the sensitivity of our results on firms’ need of 
external financing. Specifically, we explore both industry-level and firm-level heterogeneity in 
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external financing dependence, and we use both ex-ante and ex-post measure of external 
financing need to see whether our results are specifically stronger among firms that are highly 
dependent on external equity financing.  Next, we examine the role of different firm-level 
stakeholders in constraining or encouraging firm managers engaging in earnings management. 
We examine firm heterogeneity in their auditors, analyst coverage, and domestic institutional 
holders to see what the role of these stakeholders are playing in firms’ financial reporting 
decision makings. We then explore whether our results vary among different institutional 
features, such as legal enforcement.  We use several legal enforcement measures that are 
reflecting the quality of institutions from different angels to provide further evidence on the role 
of institutional characteristics that might contribute to firms’ upward earnings management.  
5.1 The Need of External Capital 
5.1.1 Equity finance dependence 
We first explore the effect of equity finance dependence on the relation between equity 
market openness and earnings management. With stronger external finance dependence, firms 
are more likely to rely on financing opportunities in the equity market. Therefore, we predict that 
the effect of equity market openness on earnings management is more pronounced in external 
finance dependent sectors. Specifically, we obtain estimation results based on the following 
equation: 
ܣܥܥ௜,௝,௖,௧ = α଴ + ߚଵܱ݌݁݊௖,௧ + ߚଶܧݔݐ݂݅݊௝ + ߚଷܱ݌݁݊௖,௧ ∗ ܧݍ݂݅݊௝ + ߛܺ௜,௝,௖,௧ + ߜܺ௖,௧
+ ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ +  ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ 
+  ܻ݁ܽݎ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ + ߭௜,௝,௖,௧ 
 (3) 
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where ܣܥܥ௜,௝,௖,௧  is working capital accruals or total accruals. Open is the indicator for equity 
market openness. ܧݔݐ݂݅݊  is the sectoral external finance dependence. X represents all other 
variables that are detailed in equation (1). We cluster standard errors by country and we predict 
the coefficient of interest ߚଷ to be positive and significant. 
As detailed in Section 3.1.2, we use three measures of sectoral dependence on equity 
finance. The first and most basic measure is the external equity finance dependence Extfin, which 
is calculated as the industry median ratio of the net equity issuance amount to capital expenditure. 
The second measure is R&D intensity, calculated as the industry median ratio of R&D spending 
scaled by total assets. The third measure is Investment Intensity, calculated as the industry 
median ratio of capital expenditure to net property, plant and equipment. All these three 
measures are constructed by industry using all publicly traded firms in each SIC two-digit 
industry in the United States from 1980 to 1989 following Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
We report the results in Table 5. Because the equity finance dependence index varies at the 
sectoral level, the main effects will be absorbed by industry fixed effects. The first two columns 
show the results of using external finance dependence Extfin. As we can see, all the coefficients 
of interaction terms are positive and significant across the four columns. Columns (3) and (4) 
show the results of using R&D intensity RD_intensity, columns (5) and (6) show the results 
using investment intensity Inv_intensity. All interaction terms are positive and significant, 
suggesting the strong differential effect among industries that are highly dependent on external 
finance. Consistent with our second hypothesis, these results reinforce our finding that the effect 
of equity market openness on earnings management is more pronounced in highly external 
finance dependent sectors. 
5.1.2 Financial Constraints 
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Compared to unconstrained firms, firms that have limited ability to raise external fund are 
more concerned if financing opportunities exist in the equity market. Lamont et al. (2001) find 
that financially constrained firms are more sensitive to monetary policy and changes in 
macroeconomic conditions. Similarly, in countries with opening of the equity market, financially 
constrained firms are expected to be more incentivized to manage earnings upward. We therefore 
explore how financial constraints affect the relation between equity market openness and 
earnings management. Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
ܣܥܥ௜,௝,௖,௧ = α଴ + ߚଵܱ݌݁݊௖,௧ + ߚଶܨ݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ ܥ݋݊ݏݐݎܽ݅݊ݐݏ௜,௝,௖,௧ିଵ + ߚଷܱ݌݁݊௖,௧
∗ ܨ݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ ܥ݋݊ݏݐݎܽ݅݊ݐݏ௜,௝,௖,௧ିଵ + ߛܺ௜,௝,௖,௧ + ߜܺ௖,௧ + ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ
+  ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ +  ܻ݁ܽݎ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ + ߭௜,௝,௖,௧ 
 (4) 
where ܣܥܥ௜,௝,௖,௧ is working capital accruals or total accruals. Open is the indicator for equity 
market openness. ܨ݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ ܥ݋݊ݏݐݎܽ݅݊ݐݏ  is the firm-level proxy for financial constraints. X 
represents all other variables that are detailed in equation (1). We cluster standard errors by 
country. We predict the coefficient of interest ߚଷ to be positive and significant. 
We use three proxies of financial constraints following prior literature: the SA index, the 
WW index and the KZ index. The SA index the index in year t-1 following Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010); the WW index is the index in year t-1 constructed following Whited and Wu (2006); KZ 
is the index in year t-1 constructed following Kaplan and Zingales (1997). For these proxies, 
higher values of the index indicate greater financial constraints. The exact computation of these 
measures is described in the Appendix. 
The estimation results are presented in table 6. The first two columns show the results 
using the KZ index. Consistent our prediction in the second hypothesis, all four interactions are 
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positive and significant. The next two columns show the results of using WW index and the final 
two columns show the results of using SA index. As we can see, all interactions are positive and 
statistically significant across the specifications, suggesting that the positive effect is 
concentrated among firms that are financially constrained. Overall, these findings are consistent 
with our prediction in H2 that the positive effect of equity market opening on earnings 
management increases with firms’ financially constraints. 
5.1.3 New Equity Issuance 
The tests in the prior two sections rely on constructs that are measured ex-ante. These are 
hypothesized to strengthen the motive to manage earnings upward because they indicate a need 
to attract new equity capital. The advantage of this approach is that since these constructs are ex-
ante, they are more likely to be exogenous to the earnings management. The disadvantage is that 
not all these firms will actually issue equity. Therefore, as an alternative approach we also 
examine firms that actually issue equity. Our measure Eqissue indicates whether a firm is issuing 
equity during the subsequent year and is defined as the natural logarithm of shares outstanding 
(adjusted for stock splits) in year t+1 over shares outstanding (adjusted for stock splits) in year t. 
To gauge our findings here, we also use the measure from Godsell et al. (2017) that is defined as 
the shareholders’ equity in year t+1 minus the sum of (shareholders’ equity in year t-1 + net 
income in year t + net income in year t+1).  
We therefore explore how the need for external capital affect the relation between equity 
market openness and earnings management. Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
ܣܥܥ௜,௝,௖,௧ = α଴ + ߚଵܱ݌݁݊௖,௧ + ߚଶܧݍ݅ݏݏݑ݁௜,௝,௖,௧ାଵ + ߚଷܱ݌݁݊௖,௧ ∗ ܧݍ݅ݏݏݑ݁௜,௝,௖,௧ାଵ + ߛܺ௜,௝,௖,௧
+ ߜܺ௖,௧ + ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ +  ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ 
+  ܻ݁ܽݎ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ + ߭௜,௝,௖,௧ 
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 (5) 
where ܣܥܥ௜,௝,௖,௧  is working capital accruals or total accruals. Open is the indicator for equity 
market openness. ܧݍ݅ݏݏݑ݁ is a continuous measure of new equity issuance. X represents all other 
variables that are detailed in equation (1). We cluster standard errors by country. We predict the 
coefficient of interest ߚଷ to be positive and significant. 
 The estimation results are presented in table 7. All coefficients on the interaction terms 
are positive and three out of the four coefficients are statistically significant, suggesting that 
firms that have subsequent new equity issuance display higher discretionary accruals during 
equity market opening periods, compared to their other counterparts. The results are generally 
consistent with our prediction in H2 that firms in need of external capital have more incentives to 
engage in upward earnings management. 
5.2 Firm-level Stakeholders: BigN auditors, Analysts and Institutional Holders 
As the evidence we document so far point to the fact that firms on average engage in 
upward earnings management when their equity market opens to foreign investors, then next we 
may want to ask a natural question: what the role of firms’ different stakeholders are playing in 
such a case during the opening period? For example, auditors tend to have disciplinary effect on 
firms’ reporting actions because of their duty as overseer to firms, while existing investors might 
encourage managers to inflate earnings because they want to sell the shares to prospective 
investors at a higher price. In this case, different parties may have both enforcement effect and 
visibility effect to the firms, and we need to know which effect dominant. 
Prior literature document that firms audited by BigN firms have significantly lower 
discretionary accruals than firms audited by non-BigN firms (see Dechow et al., 2010). In 
general, BigN auditors are reported to exhibit higher ability in refraining firms from financial 
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misreporting than other auditors. Therefore our fifth hypothesis is that the positive effect of 
equity market openness on earnings management is less pronounced in firms with BigN auditors. 
Correspondingly, we estimate the following equation: 
ܣܥܥ௜,௝,௖,௧ = α଴ + ߚଵܱ݌݁݊௖,௧ + ߚଶܤ݅݃ ௜ܰ,௝,௖,௧ + ߚଷܱ݌݁݊௖,௧ ∗ ܤ݅݃ ௜ܰ,௝,௖,௧ + ߛܺ௜,௝,௖,௧ + ߜܺ௖,௧
+ ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ +  ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ 
+  ܻ݁ܽݎ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ + ߭௜,௝,௖,௧ 
 (6) 
where ܣܥܥ௜,௝,௖,௧  is working capital accruals or total accruals. Open is the indicator for equity 
market openness. ܤ݅݃ܰ is a dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm is audited by a BigN auditor 
(auditors encoded between 1 to 8 in Capital IQ Global), and zero otherwise. X represents all 
other variables that are detailed in equation (1). We cluster standard errors by country. We 
predict the coefficient of interest ߚଷ to be negative and significant.  
In further analysis we introduce the interaction term with analyst coverage and institutional 
ownership (especially domestic institutional investor ownership) separately into the above 
equation to see what kind of role these stakeholders are playing in our setting. Analyst coverage 
data is obtained from IBES and is measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of 
analysts following the firm in the previous year. Domestic institutional ownership (DIO) data is 
extracted from FactSet LionShares and is calculated as the percentage of domestic institutional 
ownership on firms’ total shares outstanding (missing values are recoded as zero) in the previous 
year.  
Table 8 presents the estimation results. From column (1) to (6), we obtain significant 
negative coefficients on the interaction term of opening and BigN auditors. These results are 
consistent our fifth hypothesis that BigN auditors mitigate earnings management behaviors by 
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constraining firms from financial misreporting. Column (3) and (4) show the results with the 
inclusion of analyst coverage and the coefficients are statistically significantly positive. Column 
(5) and (6) show the results with the inclusion of DIO and the coefficients are statistically 
significantly positive as well. These results suggest that visibility effect of these two parties 
dominant, rather than their monitoring role during the opening periods.  
5.3 Institutional Environment 
We then explore whether institutional environment matters from firms’ financial reporting 
behaviors. We use one resource-based measure of public enforcement from Jackson and Roe 
(2009): Budget per million US dollar of GDP (extended sample, with extrapolated observations) 
is the securities regulators’ 2005 budget divided by the country’s GDP. We also use another 
measure, Perception of Corruptions Index (PCI), to measure the corruption level of institutions: 
PCI is a continuous measure of country-level corruption and is time-varying. The variable is 
rescaled so that higher value in the index PCI, the more corruption in the country. Legal 
enforcement measure is taken from Brown, Preiato and Tarca (2014) and is processed similarly 
as in Godsell et al. (2017): Total Enforcement is the sum of the scores of the following two 
measures: Audit measures the audit environment in the country, Enfor measures the regulatory 
enforcement directly related to financial statements. 
Our estimation results are shown in Table 9. Column (1) and (2) report the results of using 
the resource-based public enforcement measure, column (3) and (4) presents the results on 
perceptions of corruption, and the last two columns shows the estimation results of using total 
legal enforcement which reflects the audit and financial reporting environment. As we can see, 
the coefficients on the interaction term of opening and Budget are positive and significant, 
suggesting that institutions with stronger public enforcement are likely constrain firms from 
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doing upward earnings management. The coefficients on the interaction term of opening and 
perceptions of corruption, on the other hand, are significantly negative, suggesting institutions 
with higher level of corruption tend to encourage firms’ earnings management.  
The interaction term in the last two columns are negative but, unfortunately, not significant. 
In fact, we have tried other legal enforcement measures that are used in Godsell et al. (2017), and 
surprisingly consistently, we do not find any significant results. Consequently, we do not have 
strong enough evidence to argue that financial reporting related legal enforcement would have 
any power in constraining firms from conducting financial misreporting behaviors. 
6. Conclusion 
Equity financing is a vital resource of capital for firms in many countries and there is 
significant academic interest in the equity market financing opportunities. Previous studies 
document that macroeconomic changes and regulatory reforms are double-edged swords for 
publicly listed firms, as they provide more financing opportunity, while inducing more 
competition as well. As a result, how firms respond to these regulatory changes (especially in the 
equity market) are quite intriguing in the sense that they can either choose to be honest to gain 
investors’ trust, or to mask firm performance to attract investors. 
In this paper, we examine how equity market openness is associated with firms’ earnings 
management. Using international evidence, we find that firms exhibit significant income-
increasing earnings management during the equity market opening periods. Our results are 
robust to the use of binary and continuous values of the measurement of equity market openness, 
the inclusion of firm fixed effects, and the exclusion of pure control groups, and are concentrated 
in the year of opening. Cross-sectionally, we find that the positive relation between equity 
market openness and earnings management is more pronounced in sectors that are more 
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dependent on external equity finance, and among firms that are more financially constrained. 
This result is consistent with the idea that the capital market consequences of income-increasing 
earnings management could enhance the benefits the external finance dependent firms receive in 
the form of capital raising from foreign investors during the opening periods. In other words, 
with stronger equity finance dependence, firms are more likely to use financing opportunities in 
the equity market.  
Furthermore, we find that firms with BigN auditors do less earnings management, while 
firms with higher analyst coverage and domestic institutional ownership exhibit higher 
discretionary accruals during the opening periods. This result is consistent with prior literature 
that BigN auditors mitigate earnings management behaviors by constraining firms from financial 
misreporting, while analysts and domestic investors put pressure on firm managers to enhance 
firms’ visibility to foreign prospective investors. Lastly, we show some evidence that firms from 
economies with better institutional quality would do less earnings management, suggesting the 
effectiveness of monitoring role from local legal institutions. 
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. We add to the literature on 
financing opportunities and earnings management. We show that when facing financing 
opportunities brought by equity market opening, it provides special financing incentives for 
firms to be attractive to potential investors, especially for firms dependent on equity finance and 
with financial constraints. Unlike IPOs or SEOs, it is harder to argue that these decisions are 
driven by firms’ intrinsic need of external funds. Our paper also adds to the literature 
documenting the benefits and costs of financial globalization in the finance and economic 
literature. With few exceptions, previous studies document mainly the benefits of financial 
globalization such as facilitating investment, firm growth and other operational performance. 
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Our paper, however, contributes to the literature by providing evidence on some of the costs of 
financial globalization. When an equity market opens to foreign investors, firms seem to forego 
the long run growth but try to seize short run gain instead, which in the aggregate may lead to 
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Table A1. Variables Definition 
Variables  Variables Definition Data Source 
WC_ACC Working capital accruals, measured as the change in current assets minus the change in current liabilities minus the change in cash plus change in short-term debt (change in cash and short-term debt are included in the calculate to adjust for current liabilities used for financing). 
Capital IQ Global 
TOT_ACC Total accruals, measured as the change in current assets minus the change in current liabilities minus the change in cash plus change in short-term debt (change in cash and short-term debt are included in the calculate to adjust for current liabilities used for financing) minus depreciation expense. 
Capital IQ Global 
Opening A dummy variable representing the official liberalization in the equity market, which takes the value of 1 for a given country at the year of official liberalization, otherwise equals to 0. The official liberalization year is collectively from Bekaert et al. (2005), Bekaert et al. (2013), and Chan and Kwok (2017). 
Bekaert et al. (2005), Bekaert et al. (2013), Chan and Kwok (2017) 
Firm Characteristics 
1/TotAssets The inverse of total assets in year t-1. Capital IQ Global CFOt-1,t,t+1 Cash flows from operations in year t − 1, t, and t + 1 scaled by total assets in year t-1. Capital IQ Global PPE Net property, plant, and equipment, scaled by total assets in year t-1. Capital IQ Global ∆REV-∆AR The change in Sales minus the change in Accounts Receivable, scaled by total assets in year t-1. Capital IQ Global Size Firm size measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalization in US dollars. Capital IQ Global Leverage Book leverage, defined as long-term debt plus the current portion of long-term debt, scaled by total assets. Capital IQ Global Growth Backward-looking growth proxy, calculated as the yearly differenced sales growth (i.e., (Salesi,t- Salesi,t-1)/Salesi,t-1). 
Capital IQ Global 
Std(sales) Operating volatility, defined as the standard deviation of sales over the past three years, that is, t, t − 1, t − 2. Capital IQ Global NOA Net operating assets, calculated as the sum of shareholders’ equity and interest-bearing debt, minus cash assets, scaled by sales. Capital IQ Global ROA Current period growth proxy, calculated as the net income scaled by year t-1 total assets for firm i during the current year (i.e., NIi,t/TotAssetsi,t-1);  
Capital IQ Global 
MB forward-looking growth proxy, calculated as the market-to-book ratio for equity at the beginning of the year (i.e., Market Valuei,t-1/Book Valuei,t-1). 
Capital IQ Global 
SA index = (−0.737 ∗ Size௜௧) + (0.043 ∗ Size௜௧ ଶ) − (0.040 ∗ Age௜௧) , where Size is the natural logarithm of total assets, Age is the number of years the firm has been on Capital IQ Global with a non-missing stock price. 
Capital IQ Global 
WW index = −0.091 ∗ CF௜௧ − 0.062 ∗ DIVPOS௜௧ + 0.021 ∗ TLTD௜௧ − Capital IQ Global 
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0.044 ∗ LNTA௜௧ + 0.102 ∗ ISG௜௧ − 0.035 ∗ SG௜௧ , where CF is cash flow from operations divided by total assets, DIVPOS is an indicator take the value of one if the firms pays cash dividends; TLTD is long term debt divided by total assets; LNTA is natural logarithm of total assets, ISG is the firm’s three-digit SIC industry sales growth, SG is firm sales growth. KZ index = −1.001909 ∗ ܥܨ௜௧ + 3.93193 ∗ ܶܮܶܦ௜௧ − 39.36780 ∗ ܶܦܫ ௜ܸ௧ −1.1314759 ∗ ܥܣܵܪ௜௧ + 0.2826389 ∗ ܳ௜௧ , where CF is cash flow scaled by total assets; TLTD is long-term debt scaled by total assets; TDIV is dividend scaled by total assets, CASH is cash and short-term investment scaled by total assets, and Q is Tobin’s Q. 
Capital IQ Global 
BigN BigN auditors, equals to 1 if a firm is audited by Big auditors encoded between 1 to 8 in Capital IQ Global, and zero otherwise. Capital IQ Global No. of Analysts Firms' analyst coverage, calculated as the arithmetic mean of the 12 monthly numbers of earnings forecasts for firm i extracted from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System summary file over fiscal year t following He and Tian (2013). 
I/B/E/S 
DIO Firms’ domestic institutional ownership, defined as the percentage of domestic institutional ownership on firms’ total shares outstanding (missing values are recoded as zero). 
FactSet Stock Ownership 
Eqissue1 Firms’ new equity issuance, defined as the natural logarithm of the shares outstanding (adjusted for stock splits) in year t+1 over shares outstanding (adjusted for stock splits) in year t. 
Capital IQ Global 
Eqissue2 Alternative measure of firms’ new equity issuance, defined as the shareholders’ equity in year t+1 minus the sum of (shareholders’ equity in year t-1 + net income in year t + net income in year t+1) by following Godsell et al. (2017). 
Capital IQ Global 
Industry Characteristics   
EqFin Industry-level dependence on external equity finance, measured as the ratio of the net equity issuance amount to capital expenditure for the median publicly traded firm in each industry in the United States from 1980 to 1989 following Rajan & Zingales (1998). 
Capital IQ North America 
Inv_Intensity Industry-level Investment Intensity, measured as the industry median ratio of capital expenditure to net property, plant and equipment of all U.S. public firms from 1980 to 1989 following Rajan & Zingales (1998). 
Capital IQ North America 
R&D Intensity Industry-level R&D intensity, the industry median ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets following Li (2011), using all U.S. public firms from 1980 to 1989. 
Capital IQ North America 
Country characteristics  
GDP Growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
World Bank WDI 
Inflation Inflation rate, the rate of price change in the economy as measured by World Bank WDI 
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the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. TradeOpen Trade openness measured as the sum of imports and exports of goods and services divided by GDP. World Bank WDI GovExp General government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP. World Bank WDI FinDev Financial Development measured as Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP.  World Bank GFD database IFRS_Post  A dummy variable equals to 1 if the country is on or after the year of IFRS adoption and zero otherwise. IFRS website, George et al. (2016) Budget Resource-based measure of public enforcement measured as the securities regulators’ 2005 budget divided by the country’s GDP (extended sample, with extrapolated observations) 
Jackson and Roe (2009) 
Perceptions of Corruption A continuous measure of country-level corruption from International Transparency and is rescaled so that higher value indicates more corruption in the country. 
International Transparency 
Total Enforcement A continuous measure of country-level legal enforcement and is calculated as the sum of Audit and Enfor: Audit measures the audit environment in the country, Enfor measures the regulatory enforcement directly related to financial statements. 
Brown, Preiato and Tarca (2014) 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Sample Composition 
Panel A: Breakdown by country 
  No. of firms % of total firms No. of  firm-years % of total  firm-years Year of First  Observation Open year Panel A.1. Economies that opened their equity markets during the sample period Argentina 59 0.25 409 0.21 1990 1989* Brazil 271 1.14 1,745 0.88 1992 1991* Bulgaria 6 0.03 26 0.01 1999 2007 Chile 143 0.60 1,201 0.61 1990 1992 China 2,306 9.70 20,578 10.38 1989 2014b Colombia 33 0.14 217 0.11 1992 1991* Croatia 60 0.25 337 0.17 1990 2013a Cyprus 42 0.18 271 0.14 1997 2004a Czech Republic 25 0.11 177 0.09 1995 2004a Egypt, Arab Rep. 73 0.31 277 0.14 1997 1992* Estonia 16 0.07 140 0.07 1997 2004a Hungary 25 0.11 190 0.10 1997 2004a India 2,485 10.46 15,225 7.68 1991 1992 Indonesia 96 0.40 364 0.18 1991 1989* Israel 298 1.25 1,813 0.91 1992 1993 Jamaica 16 0.07 157 0.08 1995 1991* Jordan 72 0.30 227 0.11 1997 1995* Kenya 30 0.13 201 0.10 1992 1995 Korea, Rep. 1,088 4.58 7,244 3.65 1995 1992* Latvia 22 0.09 172 0.09 1998 2004a Lithuania 34 0.14 242 0.12 1997 2004a Malta 9 0.04 82 0.04 1997 1992* Mauritius 19 0.08 127 0.06 1996 1994* Mexico 106 0.45 1,097 0.55 1990 1989* Nigeria 73 0.31 362 0.18 1993 1995 Oman 46 0.19 303 0.15 2001 1999* Pakistan 264 1.11 1,838 0.93 1995 1991* Peru 75 0.32 637 0.32 1995 1992* Philippines 161 0.68 1,526 0.77 1990 1991 Poland 455 1.91 2,774 1.40 1996 2004a Romania 34 0.14 113 0.06 1997 2007a Saudi Arabia 96 0.40 478 0.24 1994 1999 Slovak Republic 8 0.03 47 0.02 1997 2004a Slovenia 23 0.10 160 0.08 1997 2004a South Africa 294 1.24 2,575 1.30 1989 1996 Sri Lanka 176 0.74 1,169 0.59 1995 1991* Tunisia 19 0.08 100 0.05 1998 1995* Turkey 252 1.06 1,374 0.69 1990 1989* Venezuela, RB 17 0.07 113 0.06 1992 1990* Panel A.2. Economies that opened their equity markets before the start of the sample period Australia 1,608 6.77 11,791 5.95 1988 Open Market Austria 58 0.24 411 0.21 1989 Open Market Belgium 89 0.37 663 0.33 1989 Open Market Denmark 146 0.61 1,464 0.74 1989 Open Market Finland 122 0.51 1,246 0.63 1989 Open Market France 519 2.18 3,889 1.96 1989 Open Market Germany 655 2.76 5,291 2.67 1989 Open Market 
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Greece 200 0.84 1,370 0.69 1995 Open Market Hong Kong, China 1,296 5.45 12,232 6.17 1989 Open Market Ireland 40 0.17 268 0.14 1989 Open Market Italy 255 1.07 2,111 1.07 1990 Open Market Japan 3,431 14.44 38,724 19.54 1988 Open Market Luxembourg 11 0.05 84 0.04 1990 Open Market Malaysia 957 4.03 9,248 4.67 1989 Open Market Netherlands 152 0.64 1,314 0.66 1989 Open Market Norway 132 0.56 682 0.34 1989 Open Market Singapore 774 3.26 7,311 3.69 1989 Open Market Spain 140 0.59 1,172 0.59 1990 Open Market Sweden 487 2.05 4,011 2.02 1990 Open Market Switzerland 208 0.88 2,257 1.14 1989 Open Market Thailand 494 2.08 4,769 2.41 1990 Open Market United Kingdom 2,208 9.29 19,634 9.91 1988 Open Market Panel A.3. Economies that never opened during the sample period  Kuwait 76 0.32 372 0.19 1995 NA Russian Federation 150 0.63 896 0.45 1997 NA Vietnam 226 0.95 917 0.46 2003 NA Total 23,761 100 198,215 100      Panel B: Breakdown by year 
Year No. of firms % of total firms Cumulative % 1996 and before 5,941 2.99 2.99 1997 2,146 1.08 4.08 1998 2,911 1.47 5.55 1999 4,911 2.48 8.03 2000 6,156 3.11 11.13 2001 7,951 4.01 15.14 2002 8,718 4.4 19.54 2003 9,477 4.78 24.32 2004 10,036 5.06 29.39 2005 11,083 5.59 34.98 2006 11,722 5.91 40.89 2007 12,689 6.4 47.29 2008 13,218 6.67 53.96 2009 13,700 6.91 60.87 2010 14,298 7.21 68.09 2011 14,955 7.54 75.63 2012 15,805 7.97 83.6 2013 16,583 8.37 91.97 2014 15,915 8.03 100 Total 198,215 100   Notes: This table presents the sample composition in empirical analyses. Panel A presents the sample composition by country. Panel B describes the sample composition by year. No. of firms is the number of unique firms. % of total firms is the percentage of unique firms in the overall firm observations. No. of firm-years is the total number of firm-year observations. % of total firm-years is the percentage of firm-year numbers in the overall firm-year observations. Year of first observation is the first year of observation (with no missing accruals measures) appeared in the Capital IQ Global dataset. Open year is the official liberalization year of equity market from Bekaert et al. (2005), supplemented by Bekaert et al. (2013) (denoted by a) and Chan and Kwok (2017) (denoted by b). * denotes the start year of sample country is later than the opening year. The sample period is from 1989 to 2014.   
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Sample description 
    Full sample     Opening Fully Open Never Open (N=198,215) (N = 66,088) (N = 129,942) (N = 2,185) Main Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 Mean Mean Mean Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) WC_ACC 0.014 0.125 -0.037 0.005 0.054 0.021 0.010 0.019 TOT_ACC -0.025 0.129 -0.080 -0.032 0.020 -0.015 -0.030 -0.029 Opening 0.012 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000 1/TotAssetst-1 0.029 0.092 0.002 0.006 0.018 0.026 0.030 0.023 PPEt 0.630 0.438 0.286 0.567 0.895 0.662 0.612 0.721 ∆REVt-∆ARt 0.080 0.302 -0.042 0.044 0.166 0.098 0.070 0.087 CFOt-1 0.045 0.186 -0.004 0.060 0.123 0.062 0.036 0.105 CFOt 0.045 0.173 -0.002 0.060 0.121 0.061 0.036 0.097 CFOt+1 0.046 0.170 -0.001 0.060 0.120 0.063 0.036 0.095 Sizet 4.742 2.098 3.273 4.678 6.130 4.769 4.733 4.443 Leveraget 0.248 0.229 0.058 0.207 0.374 0.285 0.229 0.296 Growtht 0.145 0.511 -0.057 0.071 0.221 0.159 0.138 0.147 Std(sales) t 0.231 0.272 0.081 0.147 0.267 0.239 0.227 0.233 NOAt-1 1.468 4.689 0.281 0.529 1.003 1.268 1.573 1.292 BigNt-1 0.362 0.480 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.199 0.443 0.400 DIOt-1 0.026 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.018 0.030 0.000 No. of Analystst-1 2.346 5.078 0.000 0.000 2.000 1.570 2.766 0.862 GDP Growtht 3.677 3.712 1.528 3.071 6.224 6.412 2.274 4.431 Inflationt 0.027 0.113 -0.001 0.020 0.039 0.054 0.012 0.108 TradeOpent 0.928 1.012 0.410 0.539 0.864 0.594 1.096 1.022 GovExpt 0.159 0.044 0.120 0.170 0.192 0.138 0.171 0.128 FinDevt 1.024 0.408 0.826 1.037 1.215 0.728 1.181 0.649 IFRS_Postt 0.417 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.457 0.399 0.319 
Panel B: Univariate analysis 
  Opening Differences  P-value   1 0 T-stats TOT_ACC 0.005* -0.025*** 0.030*** 11.28 <0.001 (0.0027) (0.0003) (0.0027)  WC_ACC 0.034*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 7.90 <0.001   (0.0027) (0.0003) (0.0026)  Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics of main variables used in the empirical analysis. In panel A, N is the total number of firm-year observations. Mean is the average value of each variable. SD is the standard deviation of each variable. Q1 is the first quartile, median is the second quartile, and Q3 is the third quartile of the distribution of each variable. WC_ACC is working capital accruals, measured as the change in current assets minus the change in current liabilities (adjusted for current liabilities used for financing). TOT_ACC is total accruals, measured as WC_ACC minus depreciation expense. Opening is a dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm is in a country at the year of official equity market opening, and zero otherwise. CFOt−1,t,t+1 are cash flows from operations in year t−1, t, and t+1 scaled by total assets in year t-1. PPE is net property, plant, and equipment, scaled by total assets in year t-1. ∆REV-∆AR is the change in sales minus the change in accounts receivable, scaled by total assets in year t-1. Size is the natural logarithm of total sales revenue. Leverage is book leverage, defined as long-term debt plus the current portion of long-term debt, scaled by total assets. Growth is sales growth, defined as sales growth from t − 1 to t. Std(sales) is operating volatility, defined as the standard deviation of sales over the past three years, that is, t, t − 1, t − 2. NOA is net operating assets, calculated as the sum of shareholders’ equity and interest-bearing debt, minus cash assets, scaled by sales. GDP Growth is the percentage change in real GDP for a given country over the year. 
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Inflation is the rate of price change in the economy as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator. TradeOpen is trade openness measured as the sum of imports and exports of goods and services divided by GDP. GovExp is general government final consumption expenditure scaled by GDP. FinDev is financial development measured as private credit to GDP. IFRS_Post is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the country is on or after the year of IFRS adoption, and zero otherwise. Panel B presents the comparative statistics between the liberalization year (Opening = 1) and all other periods (Opening = 0). The sample period is from 1989 to 2014. Standard errors in parentheses: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3: Main Regression Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES TOT_ACC WC_ACC TOT_ACC WC_ACC Opening 0.0264*** 0.0292*** 0.0078* 0.0105**  (0.000) (0.000) (0.075) (0.015) 1/TotAssetst-1 -0.0274 -0.0040 0.0186 0.0331  (0.186) (0.842) (0.609) (0.421) PPEt -0.0290*** 0.0056*** 0.0030 0.0313***  (0.000) (0.006) (0.540) (0.000) ∆REVt-∆ARt 0.0524*** 0.0567*** 0.0375*** 0.0420***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt-1 0.1394*** 0.1465*** 0.1137*** 0.1166*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt -0.4541*** -0.4407*** -0.4774*** -0.4680*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt+1 0.1304*** 0.1374*** 0.0987*** 0.1017*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Sizet 0.0054*** 0.0055*** 0.0166*** 0.0164*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Leveraget 0.0121 0.0176** 0.0283*** 0.0369*** (0.143) (0.033) (0.004) (0.001) Growtht 0.0184*** 0.0216*** 0.0177*** 0.0206*** (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Std(sales) t -0.0107*** -0.0052* -0.0011 -0.0000 (0.001) (0.071) (0.486) (0.990) NOAt-1 -0.0008 -0.0016*** -0.0020*** -0.0024***  (0.142) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) GDP Growtht 0.0010 0.0009 0.0011 0.0010  (0.273) (0.303) (0.107) (0.115) Inflationt 0.0079* 0.0124*** 0.0109* 0.0142**  (0.060) (0.004) (0.086) (0.026) TradeOpent 0.0118*** 0.0107** 0.0139*** 0.0123***  (0.010) (0.026) (0.002) (0.004) GovExpt -0.1377 -0.1482 0.1074 0.0660  (0.273) (0.322) (0.276) (0.540) FinDevt -0.0149** -0.0163** -0.0146** -0.0173**  (0.025) (0.015) (0.044) (0.015) IFRS_Postt 0.0085** 0.0032 0.0049** -0.0001  (0.036) (0.506) (0.035) (0.974) Country fixed effects Yes Yes Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Cluster at country level Yes Yes Yes Yes N 198,215 198,215 198,215 198,215 Adjusted R2 0.343 0.342 0.401 0.380 Notes: This table reports the baseline test that examines sample-wide earnings management in periods around the opening of equity market. Column (1) and (2) present results of estimating the specification model detailed in equation (1) using Opening, a dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm is in a country at the year of official equity market liberalization, and zero otherwise. Country-, industry- and year- fixed effects are included in the regressions. Column (3) to (4) repeat regressions by including firm and year fixed effects. WC_ACC is working capital accruals, measured as the change in current assets minus the change in current liabilities (adjusted for current liabilities used for financing). TOT_ACC is total accruals, measured as WC_ACC minus depreciation expense. 1/TotAssets is the 
48  
inverse of total assets in year t-1. CFOt−1,t,t+1 are cash flows from operations in year t−1, t, and t+1 scaled by total assets in year t-1. PPE is net property, plant, and equipment, scaled by total assets in year t-1. ∆REV-∆AR is the change in sales minus the change in accounts receivable, scaled by total assets in year t-1. GDP Growth is the percentage change in real GDP for a given country over the year. Inflation is the rate of price change in the economy as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator. TradeOpen is trade openness measured as the sum of imports and exports of goods and services divided by GDP. GovExp is general government final consumption expenditure divided by GDP. FinDev is financial development measured as private credit to GDP. IFRS_post is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the country is on or after the year of IFRS adoption, and zero otherwise. All other firm-level control variables are defined in Appendix. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at country level. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses:  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
49  
Table 4: Robustness checks 
Panel A: Sample-wide regression results with Event year (Opening)  OLS (Liberalizing sample) OLS (Full sample)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) VARIABLES TOT_ACC WC_ACC TOT_ACC WC_ACC TOT_ACC WC_ACC TOT_ACC WC_ACC Event year t-1 0.0071 0.0081* -0.0063** -0.0049* 0.0129** 0.0145*** -0.0062 -0.0042 (0.145) (0.070) (0.029) (0.060) (0.012) (0.004) (0.185) (0.356) Event year t 0.0244*** 0.0260*** 0.0090** 0.0109*** 0.0282*** 0.0313*** 0.0067 0.0098** (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.145) (0.026) Event year t+1 0.0046 0.0060 0.0006 0.0024 0.0072 0.0102* 0.0053 0.0086 (0.697) (0.597) (0.958) (0.847) (0.191) (0.065) (0.437) (0.181) 1/TotAssetst-1 0.0547*** 0.0684*** 0.1901*** 0.2088*** -0.0273 -0.0038 0.0187 0.0332  (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.189) (0.849) (0.608) (0.420) PPEt -0.0250*** 0.0097*** 0.0146*** 0.0431*** -0.0290*** 0.0055*** 0.0030 0.0313***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.536) (0.000) ∆REVt-∆ARt 0.0667*** 0.0723*** 0.0534*** 0.0582*** 0.0523*** 0.0566*** 0.0375*** 0.0420***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt-1 0.1225*** 0.1345*** 0.0893*** 0.0948*** 0.1394*** 0.1465*** 0.1137*** 0.1166*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt -0.6076*** -0.5888*** -0.6435*** -0.6315*** -0.4539*** -0.4405*** -0.4775*** -0.4681*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt+1 0.1031*** 0.1145*** 0.0581*** 0.0613*** 0.1303*** 0.1373*** 0.0988*** 0.1018*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Sizet 0.0088*** 0.0090*** 0.0181*** 0.0179*** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0166*** 0.0164*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Leveraget -0.0208 -0.0131 -0.0013 0.0057 0.0122 0.0178** 0.0283*** 0.0369*** (0.125) (0.398) (0.935) (0.755) (0.139) (0.031) (0.004) (0.001) Growtht 0.0189*** 0.0199*** 0.0112*** 0.0132*** 0.0183*** 0.0216*** 0.0177*** 0.0206*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Std(sales) t -0.0076 -0.0048 0.0013 0.0023 -0.0107*** -0.0052* -0.0012 -0.0000 (0.109) (0.349) (0.626) (0.390) (0.001) (0.071) (0.485) (0.983) NOAt-1 -0.0017*** -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0028*** -0.0008 -0.0016*** -0.0020*** -0.0024***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.143) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) GDP Growtht -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0011 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010  (0.340) (0.279) (0.143) (0.147) (0.224) (0.240) (0.135) (0.137) Inflationt 0.0050** 0.0095*** 0.0067** 0.0101*** 0.0080* 0.0125*** 0.0109* 0.0142**  (0.042) (0.001) (0.019) (0.001) (0.064) (0.004) (0.084) (0.024) 
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TradeOpent -0.0286 -0.0309 0.0043 0.0002 0.0124*** 0.0113*** 0.0136*** 0.0122***  (0.167) (0.112) (0.751) (0.988) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.004) GovExpt -0.2099*** -0.2578*** -0.1226* -0.1863*** -0.1253 -0.1344 0.1014 0.0616  (0.001) (0.001) (0.067) (0.001) (0.296) (0.343) (0.315) (0.577) FinDevt 0.0119 0.0082 0.0093 0.0045 -0.0149** -0.0164** -0.0145** -0.0172** (0.475) (0.610) (0.417) (0.678) (0.023) (0.014) (0.046) (0.016) IFRS_Postt 0.0091** 0.0074* 0.0080** 0.0062  0.0084** 0.0031 0.0049** -0.0002  (0.012) (0.079) (0.049) (0.160)  (0.036) (0.518) (0.040) (0.958) Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Cluster at  Country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 66,088 66,088 66,088 66,088 198,215 198,215 198,215 198,215 Adjusted R2 0.487 0.477 0.549 0.532 0.343 0.342 0.401 0.380  
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Panel B: Removal of countries with no change in equity market openness during the sample period 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES TOT_ACC WC_ACC TOT_ACC WC_ACC Opening 0.0230*** 0.0244*** 0.0106*** 0.0121***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  1/TotAssetst-1 0.0544*** 0.0681*** 0.1898*** 0.2086***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) PPEt -0.0250*** 0.0098*** 0.0145*** 0.0430***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ∆REVt-∆ARt 0.0668*** 0.0724*** 0.0533*** 0.0582***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt-1 0.1224*** 0.1344*** 0.0893*** 0.0949*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt -0.6079*** -0.5891*** -0.6433*** -0.6313*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt+1 0.1032*** 0.1145*** 0.0579*** 0.0612*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Sizet 0.0088*** 0.0090*** 0.0180*** 0.0178*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Leveraget -0.0208 -0.0132 -0.0013 0.0057 (0.122) (0.392) (0.935) (0.755) Growtht 0.0189*** 0.0199*** 0.0112*** 0.0133*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Std(sales) t -0.0076 -0.0048 0.0013 0.0023 (0.107) (0.346) (0.620) (0.385) NOAt-1 -0.0017*** -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0028***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) GDP Growtht -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0009  (0.312) (0.254) (0.156) (0.158) Inflationt 0.0050** 0.0095*** 0.0066** 0.0101***  (0.042) (0.001) (0.019) (0.001) TradeOpent -0.0319 -0.0347* 0.0071 0.0023  (0.114) (0.073) (0.561) (0.843) GovExpt -0.2116*** -0.2596*** -0.1219* -0.1854***  (0.001) (0.001) (0.069) (0.001) FinDevt 0.0132 0.0097 0.0079 0.0034  (0.432) (0.556) (0.466) (0.744) IFRS_Postt 0.0089** 0.0072* 0.0083** 0.0066  (0.014) (0.088) (0.029) (0.120) Country fixed effects Yes Yes Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Cluster at country level Yes Yes Yes Yes N 66,088 66,088 66,088 66,088 Adjusted R2 0.487 0.477 0.549 0.532  
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Panel C. Robustness with extra firm-level growth controls  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES TOT_ACC WC_ACC TOT_ACC WC_ACC 
Opening 0.0313*** 0.0340*** 0.0205*** 0.0233*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 1/TotAssetst-1 -0.0522** -0.0376 -0.0096 0.0031  (0.038) (0.117) (0.787) (0.937) PPEt -0.0364*** -0.0028 -0.0112** 0.0166***  (0.000) (0.270) (0.025) (0.001) ∆REVt-∆ARt 0.0256*** 0.0289*** 0.0132 0.0196**  (0.005) (0.001) (0.143) (0.032) CFOt-1 0.0983*** 0.1001*** 0.0762*** 0.0766*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt -0.5010*** -0.4934*** -0.5293*** -0.5222*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt+1 0.0987*** 0.1024*** 0.0724*** 0.0744*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Sizet 0.0027*** 0.0019*** 0.0093*** 0.0089*** (0.001) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) Leveraget 0.0117* 0.0183*** 0.0337*** 0.0422*** (0.092) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) Std(sales) t 0.0013 0.0065* 0.0051 0.0064** (0.688) (0.075) (0.112) (0.047) NOAt-1 0.0005** -0.0002 -0.0007** -0.0009*** (0.043) (0.162) (0.011) (0.001) ROA Quintile1 -0.0721*** -0.0714*** -0.0816*** -0.0825*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ROA Quintile2 -0.0122*** -0.0155*** -0.0217*** -0.0229*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ROA Quintile4 0.0116*** 0.0165*** 0.0209*** 0.0229*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ROA Quintile5 0.0413*** 0.0556*** 0.0578*** 0.0650*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SG Quintile1 -0.0057** -0.0052** -0.0053* -0.0041 (0.018) (0.043) (0.078) (0.188) SG Quintile2 -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0005 (0.310) (0.562) (0.344) (0.623) SG Quintile4 0.0019** 0.0013 0.0008 0.0001 (0.022) (0.143) (0.296) (0.870) SG Quintile5 0.0110*** 0.0104*** 0.0068*** 0.0061** (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.015) MB Quintile1 0.0080*** 0.0051*** 0.0055** 0.0050** (0.000) (0.008) (0.015) (0.033) MB Quintile2 0.0059*** 0.0043*** 0.0021** 0.0020** (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.038) MB Quintile4 -0.0024** -0.0019** 0.0007 0.0004 (0.013) (0.033) (0.469) (0.681) MB Quintile5 -0.0021 -0.0017 0.0027 0.0023 (0.475) (0.501) (0.206) (0.287) GDP Growtht 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004  (0.490) (0.552) (0.448) (0.512) 
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Inflationt 0.0493* 0.0474* 0.0637** 0.0613**  (0.059) (0.064) (0.019) (0.022) TradeOpent 0.0063 0.0050 0.0112** 0.0096**  (0.204) (0.313) (0.012) (0.028) GovExpt -0.1154 -0.1197 -0.0016 -0.0326  (0.286) (0.328) (0.984) (0.722) FinDevt -0.0103 -0.0114 -0.0068 -0.0096 (0.197) (0.129) (0.389) (0.210) IFRS_Postt 0.0077** 0.0027 0.0055*** 0.0006  (0.022) (0.487) (0.006) (0.835) Country fixed effects Yes Yes Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Cluster at country level Yes Yes Yes Yes N 170,334 170,334 167,878 167,878 Adjusted R2 0.386 0.394 0.442 0.423 Notes: This table reports robustness tests that examine sample-wide earnings management in periods around the liberalization of equity market. Panel A presents the results of estimating the expanded specification detailed in equation (1) using event year t-1, t, t+1, which is 1 year before, current year, and one year after the opening year, respectively, using both liberalizing sample (with removal of countries that have open markets or never opened during the sample period) and full sample. Panel B presents the results of estimating the expanded specification detailed in equation (1) using the liberalizing sample. In Panel C, extra firm-level growth measures ROA, Sales Growth and Market to Book (quintiles) are included following Collins et al. (2017). WC_ACC is working capital accruals, measured as the change in current assets minus the change in current liabilities (adjusted for current liabilities used for financing). TOT_ACC is total accruals, measured as WC_ACC minus depreciation expense. Opening is a dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm is in a country at the year of official equity market liberalization, and zero otherwise. 1/TotAssets is the inverse of total assets in year t-1. CFOt−1,t,t+1 are cash flows from operations in year t−1, t, and t+1 scaled by total assets in year t-1. PPE is net property, plant, and equipment, scaled by total assets in year t-1. ∆REV-∆AR is the change in sales minus the change in accounts receivable, scaled by total assets in year t-1. All other control variables are defined in Appendix. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at country level. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses:  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance levels at 




Table 5: External finance dependence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) VARIABLES TOT_ACC WC_ACC TOT_ACC WC_ACC TOT_ACC WC_ACC Opening*Eqfin 0.0336*** 0.0221*** (0.000) (0.000) Opening*RD_Intensity 0.2716*** 0.1722** (0.002) (0.042) Opening*Inv_Intensity 0.2072*** 0.1526*** (0.000) (0.000) Opening 0.0160*** 0.0224*** 0.0180*** 0.0241*** -0.0251*** -0.0086 (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.241) 1/TotAssetst-1 -0.0277 -0.0042 -0.0279 -0.0043 -0.0277 -0.0041  (0.185) (0.837) (0.180) (0.830) (0.185) (0.839) PPEt -0.0289*** 0.0056*** -0.0290*** 0.0056*** -0.0289*** 0.0056***  (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.006) ∆REVt-∆ARt 0.0525*** 0.0568*** 0.0524*** 0.0567*** 0.0525*** 0.0568***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt-1 0.1395*** 0.1467*** 0.1396*** 0.1467*** 0.1396*** 0.1467*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt -0.4541*** -0.4407*** -0.4540*** -0.4406*** -0.4541*** -0.4406*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt+1 0.1303*** 0.1373*** 0.1303*** 0.1374*** 0.1303*** 0.1373*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Sizet 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Leveraget 0.0120 0.0176** 0.0120 0.0176** 0.0120 0.0176** (0.141) (0.032) (0.139) (0.031) (0.138) (0.031) Growtht 0.0183*** 0.0216*** 0.0184*** 0.0217*** 0.0182*** 0.0216*** (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) Std(sales) t -0.0113*** -0.0058** -0.0112*** -0.0056** -0.0113*** -0.0058** (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.036) NOAt-1 -0.0008 -0.0016*** -0.0008 -0.0016*** -0.0008 -0.0016***  (0.151) (0.001) (0.154) (0.001) (0.151) (0.001) GDP Growtht 0.0010 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009  (0.272) (0.301) (0.267) (0.296) (0.272) (0.301) Inflationt 0.0079* 0.0124*** 0.0078* 0.0123*** 0.0079* 0.0124***  (0.059) (0.003) (0.058) (0.003) (0.059) (0.003) TradeOpent 0.0117** 0.0105** 0.0115** 0.0104** 0.0117** 0.0105**  (0.011) (0.028) (0.012) (0.030) (0.011) (0.029) GovExpt -0.1420 -0.1528 -0.1401 -0.1511 -0.1418 -0.1525  (0.258) (0.307) (0.266) (0.313) (0.260) (0.309) FinDevt -0.0148** -0.0162** -0.0147** -0.0161** -0.0148** -0.0162** (0.026) (0.016) (0.028) (0.017) (0.026) (0.016) IFRS_Postt 0.0083** 0.0030 0.0082** 0.0029 0.0083** 0.0030  (0.038) (0.528) (0.039) (0.539) (0.038) (0.528) Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Cluster at country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 197,974 197,974 197,346 197,346 197,974 197,974 Adjusted R2 0.342 0.342 0.342 0.341 0.343 0.342 Notes: This table presents results examining the role of industry external finance dependence on the effect of equity market integration on firms’ earnings management. We use three measurements of industry-level external finance dependence. Eqfin is the need for external equity finance calculated as the median fraction of the net equity issuance 
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amount to capital expenditure following Rajan & Zingales (1998). Similarly, R&D/AT is R&D intensity measured as the industry median of R&D spending scaled by year beginning total assets. Inv_intensity is investment intensity measured as the industry median ratio of capital expenditure to net property, plant and equipment. All these three measures are calculated using all publicly traded firms in each SIC two-digit industry in the United States from 1980 to 1989. WC_ACC is working capital accruals, measured as the change in current assets minus the change in current liabilities (adjusted for current liabilities used for financing). TOT_ACC is total accruals, measured as WC_ACC minus depreciation expense. Opening is a dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm is in a country at the year of official equity market liberalization, and zero otherwise. 1/TotAssets is the inverse of total assets in year t-1. CFOt−1,t,t+1 are cash flows from operations in year t−1, t, and t+1 scaled by total assets in year t-1. PPE is net property, plant, and equipment, scaled by total assets in year t-1. ∆REV-∆AR is the change in sales minus the change in accounts receivable, scaled by total assets in year t-1. All other control variables are defined in Appendix. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at country level. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses:  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and 





Table 6: Financial Constraints 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) VARIABLES TOT_ACC WC_ACC TOT_ACC WC_ACC TOT_ACC WC_ACC Opening*KZ_t-1 0.0203*** 0.0200***   (0.000) (0.000)   Opening*WW_t-1   0.1869*** 0.2188***   (0.000) (0.000) Opening*SA_t-1     0.0176** 0.0126*     (0.034) (0.094) KZ_t-1 -0.0092*** -0.0081***   (0.000) (0.000)   WW_t-1   0.0031 0.0040*   (0.182) (0.077) SA_t-1     0.0288*** 0.0349***     (0.000) (0.000) Opening 0.0277*** 0.0301*** 0.0869*** 0.0997*** 0.0827*** 0.0689** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.014) 1/TotAssetst-1 -0.0345 -0.0107 -0.0288 -0.0065 -0.1219*** -0.1182***  (0.101) (0.605) (0.168) (0.747) (0.000) (0.000) PPEt -0.0281*** 0.0063*** -0.0291*** 0.0054*** -0.0283*** 0.0063**  (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.011) ∆REVt-∆ARt 0.0442*** 0.0485*** 0.0524*** 0.0565*** 0.0483*** 0.0518***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt-1 0.1183*** 0.1273*** 0.1390*** 0.1460*** 0.1387*** 0.1456*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt -0.4490*** -0.4343*** -0.4531*** -0.4397*** -0.4527*** -0.4389*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt+1 0.1252*** 0.1326*** 0.1309*** 0.1376*** 0.1315*** 0.1387*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Sizet 0.0051*** 0.0052*** 0.0056*** 0.0056*** 0.0098*** 0.0107*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Leveraget 0.0262*** 0.0303*** 0.0123 0.0180** 0.0185** 0.0254*** (0.001) (0.000) (0.129) (0.027) (0.018) (0.001) Growtht 0.0203*** 0.0234*** 0.0182*** 0.0215*** 0.0176*** 0.0207*** (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) Std(sales) t -0.0124*** -0.0070** -0.0114*** -0.0060** -0.0146*** -0.0099*** (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.047) (0.000) (0.003) NOAt-1 -0.0006 -0.0015*** -0.0008 -0.0016*** -0.0008* -0.0016***  (0.201) (0.000) (0.152) (0.001) (0.096) (0.000) GDP Growtht 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 0.0010 0.0009  (0.303) (0.333) (0.328) (0.362) (0.294) (0.329) Inflationt 0.0625** 0.0623** 0.0664** 0.0680** 0.0071* 0.0115***  (0.012) (0.011) (0.026) (0.022) (0.085) (0.006) TradeOpent 0.0077 0.0069 0.0100* 0.0089 0.0107** 0.0094**  (0.131) (0.186) (0.060) (0.108) (0.012) (0.033) GovExpt -0.1126 -0.1148 -0.1074 -0.1236 -0.1521 -0.1648  (0.377) (0.418) (0.381) (0.397) (0.222) (0.265) FinDevt -0.0150* -0.0168** -0.0171** -0.0186** -0.0141** -0.0153** (0.068) (0.036) (0.035) (0.020) (0.041) (0.028) IFRS_Postt 0.0076* 0.0022 0.0090** 0.0037 0.0065* 0.0007  (0.053) (0.626) (0.026) (0.433) (0.064) (0.851) Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Cluster at country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 185,459 185,459 193,687 193,687 198,214 198,214 Adjusted R2 0.338 0.336 0.343 0.342 0.349 0.351 Notes: This table presents results examining the role of financial constraints on the effect of equity market integration on firms’ earnings management. We use three measurements of firms’ financial constraints. KZ is the index in year t-1 constructed following Kaplan and Zingales (1997); WW is the index in year t-1 constructed following Whited and Wu (2006); SA is the index in year t-1 constructed following Hadlock and Pierce (2010). WC_ACC is working capital accruals, measured as the change in current assets minus the change in current liabilities (adjusted for current liabilities used for financing). TOT_ACC is total accruals, measured as WC_ACC minus depreciation expense. Opening is a dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm is in a country at the year of official equity market liberalization, and zero otherwise. 1/TotAssets is the inverse of total assets in year t-1. CFOt−1,t,t+1 are cash flows from operations in year t−1, t, and t+1 scaled by total assets in year t-1. PPE is net property, plant, and equipment, scaled by total assets in year t-1. ∆REV-∆AR is the change in sales minus the change in accounts receivable, scaled by total assets in year t-1. All other control variables are defined in Appendix. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at country level. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses:  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7: New Equity Issuance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES TOT_ACC WC_ACC TOT_ACC WC_ACC Opening*Eqissue1 0.0145*** 0.0126*** (0.006) (0.009) Opening*Eqissue2 0.0111* 0.0081 (0.099) (0.168) Eqissue1 0.0041 0.0046*   (0.166) (0.081)   Eqissue2   0.0097*** 0.0134***    (0.000) (0.000) Opening 0.0228*** 0.0260*** 0.0203*** 0.0234*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 1/TotAssetst-1 -0.0298 -0.0062 -0.0319 -0.0103  (0.159) (0.763) (0.207) (0.654) PPEt -0.0288*** 0.0057*** -0.0318*** 0.0026  (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.205) ∆REVt-∆ARt 0.0523*** 0.0566*** 0.0502*** 0.0533***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt-1 0.1391*** 0.1461*** 0.1390*** 0.1466*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt -0.4555*** -0.4420*** -0.4591*** -0.4439*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt+1 0.1306*** 0.1377*** 0.1335*** 0.1425*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Sizet 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0052*** 0.0053*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Leveraget 0.0122 0.0177** 0.0133 0.0181** (0.141) (0.033) (0.133) (0.038) Growtht 0.0179*** 0.0212*** 0.0199*** 0.0226*** (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Std(sales) t -0.0102*** -0.0047 -0.0140*** -0.0096*** (0.002) (0.135) (0.000) (0.005) NOAt-1 -0.0008 -0.0017*** -0.0009 -0.0017***  (0.133) (0.000) (0.122) (0.000) GDP Growtht 0.0010 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007  (0.295) (0.327) (0.437) (0.450) Inflationt 0.0076* 0.0120*** 0.0944** 0.0910**  (0.062) (0.003) (0.011) (0.012) TradeOpent 0.0117** 0.0106** 0.0051 0.0038  (0.012) (0.029) (0.348) (0.500) GovExpt -0.1443 -0.1556 -0.1263 -0.1483  (0.255) (0.302) (0.277) (0.266) FinDevt -0.0148** -0.0162** -0.0082 -0.0099 (0.026) (0.015) (0.285) (0.140) IFRS_Postt 0.0084** 0.0031 0.0093*** 0.0037  (0.034) (0.511) (0.008) (0.343) Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Cluster at country level Yes Yes Yes Yes N 197,707 197,707 157,361 157,361 Adjusted R2 0.345 0.344 0.360 0.357 
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Notes: This table presents results examining the role of new equity issuances on the effect of equity market integration on firms’ earnings management. We use two ex post measures of firms’ new equity issuance: Eqissue1 indicates whether a firm is issuing equity during the subsequent year and is defined as the natural logarithm of the shares outstanding (adjusted for stock splits) in year t+1 over shares outstanding (adjusted for stock splits) in year t. Eqissue2 is the Godsell et al. (2017) measure which is calculated as the shareholders’ equity in year t+1 minus the sum of (shareholders’ equity in year t-1 + net income in year t + net income in year t+1). WC_ACC is working capital accruals, measured as the change in current assets minus the change in current liabilities (adjusted for current liabilities used for financing). TOT_ACC is total accruals, measured as WC_ACC minus depreciation expense. Opening is a dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm is in a country at the year of official equity market liberalization, and zero otherwise. 1/TotAssets is the inverse of total assets in year t-1. CFOt−1,t,t+1 are cash flows from operations in year t−1, t, and t+1 scaled by total assets in year t-1. PPE is net property, plant, and equipment, scaled by total assets in year t-1. ∆REV-∆AR is the change in sales minus the change in accounts receivable, scaled by total assets in year t-1. All other control variables are defined in Appendix. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at country level. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses:  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  
Table 8: Firm-level characteristics: Auditors, Analysts, Institutional Holdings 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) VARIABLES TOT_ACC WC_ACC TOT_ACC WC_ACC TOT_ACC WC_ACC Opening*BigNt-1 -0.0232*** -0.0258*** -0.0258*** -0.0279*** -0.0215*** -0.0245*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006)  Opening*Analystst-1 0.0114*** 0.0090*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  Opening*DIOt-1 0.2097*** 0.1629*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  BigNt-1 -0.0070*** -0.0057*** -0.0068*** -0.0056*** -0.0067*** -0.0055*** (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) Analystst-1 -0.0017 -0.0009 
 (0.257) (0.502) DIOt-1 -0.0255*** -0.0172* 
 (0.002) (0.095)  Opening 0.0283*** 0.0315*** 0.0195** 0.0246*** 0.0234*** 0.0277*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 1/TotAssetst-1 -0.0302 -0.0062 -0.0293 -0.0058 -0.0313 -0.0070  (0.163) (0.764) (0.184) (0.784) (0.147) (0.734) PPEt -0.0289*** 0.0056*** -0.0290*** 0.0056*** -0.0290*** 0.0056***  (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.006) ∆REVt-∆ARt 0.0522*** 0.0566*** 0.0522*** 0.0566*** 0.0522*** 0.0566***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt-1 0.1396*** 0.1466*** 0.1398*** 0.1467*** 0.1396*** 0.1466*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt -0.4540*** -0.4406*** -0.4538*** -0.4405*** -0.4540*** -0.4405*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt+1 0.1307*** 0.1377*** 0.1308*** 0.1377*** 0.1307*** 0.1376*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Sizet 0.0057*** 0.0057*** 0.0062*** 0.0060*** 0.0059*** 0.0058*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Leveraget 0.0122 0.0177** 0.0124 0.0178** 0.0121 0.0177** (0.141) (0.033) (0.140) (0.034) (0.141) (0.033) Growtht 0.0184*** 0.0216*** 0.0183*** 0.0216*** 0.0184*** 0.0216*** (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) Std(sales) t -0.0111*** -0.0055* -0.0112*** -0.0056** -0.0112*** -0.0056* (0.000) (0.055) (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.051) NOAt-1 -0.0008 -0.0017*** -0.0008 -0.0017*** -0.0008 -0.0017***  (0.128) (0.000) (0.125) (0.000) (0.127) (0.000) GDP Growtht 0.0010 0.0009 0.0010 0.0009 0.0010 0.0009  (0.283) (0.307) (0.283) (0.304) (0.286) (0.309) Inflationt 0.0079* 0.0124*** 0.0079* 0.0124*** 0.0080* 0.0124***  (0.064) (0.004) (0.067) (0.004) (0.063) (0.004) TradeOpent 0.0118** 0.0107** 0.0116** 0.0106** 0.0113** 0.0104**  (0.012) (0.028) (0.013) (0.026) (0.020) (0.038) GovExpt -0.1371 -0.1470 -0.1402 -0.1484 -0.1284 -0.1411  (0.274) (0.326) (0.272) (0.321) (0.319) (0.351) FinDevt -0.0152** -0.0166** -0.0151** -0.0166** -0.0142** -0.0159** (0.021) (0.013) (0.023) (0.014) (0.039) (0.021) IFRS_Postt 0.0080** 0.0028 0.0082** 0.0029 0.0082** 0.0029  (0.046) (0.557) (0.034) (0.529) (0.041) (0.541) Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
Cluster at country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 198,165 198,165 198,165 198,165 198,165 198,165 Adjusted R-squared 0.343 0.343 0.344 0.343 0.344 0.343 Notes: This table presents results examining the role of firm-level stakeholders on the effect of equity market integration on firms’ earnings management. BigN is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a firm is audited by big auditors numbered from 01 to 08 in Capital IQ Global, otherwise zero, and is measured in fiscal year end of t-1. Analysts is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the total number of analysts following the firm and is measured one month before the fiscal year end of the firm (missing values are recoded as zero)13. DIO is the percentage of domestic institutional ownership on firms’ total shares outstanding (missing values are recoded as zero) and is measured in calendar year end of t-114. WC_ACC is working capital accruals, measured as the change in current assets minus the change in current liabilities (adjusted for current liabilities used for financing). TOT_ACC is total accruals, measured as WC_ACC minus depreciation expense. Opening is a dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm is in a country at the year of official equity market liberalization, and zero otherwise. 1/TotAssets is the inverse of total assets in year t-1. CFOt−1,t,t+1 are cash flows from operations in year t−1, t, and t+1 scaled by total assets in year t-1. PPE is net property, plant, and equipment, scaled by total assets in year t-1. ∆REV-∆AR is the change in sales minus the change in accounts receivable, scaled by total assets in year t-1. All other control variables are defined in Appendix. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at country level. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses:  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
                                                     13 Estimation results are similar if we use sample by excluding firms having no analyst following in the sample. 14 Estimation results do not substantially change if we use the percentage of overall institutional ownership on firms’ total shares outstanding (IO).  
  
Table 9: Country-level characteristics: resource-based public enforcement, corruption and total enforcement  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) VARIABLES TOT_ACC WC_ACC TOT_ACC WC_ACC TOT_ACC WC_ACC Opening*Budget -0.0153** -0.0159** (0.041) (0.036) Opening*Perceptions of Corruption 0.0211*** 0.0265*** (0.000) (0.000) Opening*Total  Enforcement -0.0001 0.0003 (0.947) (0.799) Opening 0.1041*** 0.1003*** 0.1087*** 0.1315*** 0.0320 0.0212 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.456) (0.623) Perceptions of Corruption 0.0024 0.0009 (0.411) (0.757) Total Enforcement -0.0002 -0.0003 (0.458) (0.301) 1/TotAssetst-1 -0.0300** -0.0015 -0.0281 -0.0051 -0.0309 -0.0069  (0.030) (0.920) (0.161) (0.793) (0.126) (0.718) PPEt -0.0280*** 0.0057*** -0.0290*** 0.0054*** -0.0290*** 0.0055***  (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.010) ∆REVt-∆ARt 0.0425*** 0.0475*** 0.0524*** 0.0570*** 0.0523*** 0.0568***  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt-1 0.1318*** 0.1385*** 0.1393*** 0.1460*** 0.1392*** 0.1459*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt -0.3956*** -0.3824*** -0.4513*** -0.4385*** -0.4500*** -0.4370*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) CFOt+1 0.1306*** 0.1371*** 0.1314*** 0.1382*** 0.1302*** 0.1369*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Sizet 0.0037*** 0.0039*** 0.0054*** 0.0055*** 0.0054*** 0.0055*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Leveraget 0.0189*** 0.0265*** 0.0119 0.0176** 0.0117 0.0174** (0.003) (0.000) (0.141) (0.032) (0.150) (0.036) Growtht 0.0172*** 0.0211*** 0.0179*** 0.0212*** 0.0180*** 0.0212*** (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) Std(sales) t -0.0078** -0.0014 -0.0108*** -0.0054* -0.0105*** -0.0050* (0.023) (0.504) (0.001) (0.079) (0.002) (0.095) NOAt-1 -0.0005 -0.0014*** -0.0008 -0.0016*** -0.0008 -0.0016***  (0.351) (0.005) (0.144) (0.001) (0.147) (0.001) GDP Growtht 0.0014** 0.0012* 0.0011 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009  (0.050) (0.080) (0.218) (0.236) (0.344) (0.382) Inflationt 0.0048** 0.0091*** 0.0558* 0.0636** 0.0072* 0.0119***  (0.015) (0.000) (0.074) (0.039) (0.059) (0.003) TradeOpent 0.0187*** 0.0185*** 0.0114** 0.0099* 0.0126*** 0.0118***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.046) (0.091) (0.002) (0.007) GovExpt -0.0312 -0.0092 -0.1097 -0.1190 -0.1701 -0.1692  (0.680) (0.920) (0.367) (0.415) (0.269) (0.349) FinDevt -0.0118** -0.0121** -0.0161** -0.0168*** -0.0147* -0.0160** (0.022) (0.015) (0.014) (0.007) (0.051) (0.036) IFRS_Postt 0.0021 -0.0069** 0.0086** 0.0034 0.0087** 0.0034  (0.554) (0.010) (0.032) (0.479) (0.041) (0.502) Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Cluster at country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 140,507 140,507 197,057 197,057 194,970 194,970 Adjusted R-squared 0.287 0.292 0.340 0.340 0.338 0.338 Notes: This table reports the role of legal enforcement on the effect of equity market opening on firms’ earnings management. We use several measures related to country-level characteristics. Budget is a resource-based measure of public enforcement from Jackson and Roe (2009) and is the securities regulators’ 2005 budget divided by the country’s GDP (extended sample, with extrapolated observations). Perceptions of Corruption Index (PCI) is a continuous measure of country-level corruption from International Transparency and is rescaled so that higher value indicates more corruption in the country. Total Enforcement is a continuous measure of country-level legal enforcement from Brown, Preiato and Tarca (2014) and is calculated as the sum of Audit and Enfor: Audit measures the audit environment in the country, Enfor measures the regulatory enforcement directly related to financial statements. WC_ACC is working capital accruals, measured as the change in current assets minus the change in current liabilities (adjusted for current liabilities used for financing). TOT_ACC is total accruals, measured as WC_ACC minus depreciation expense. Opening is a dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm is in a country at the year of official equity market liberalization, and zero otherwise. 1/TotAssets is the inverse of total assets in year t-1. CFOt−1,t,t+1 are cash flows from operations in year t−1, t, and t+1 scaled by total assets in year t-1. PPE is net property, plant, and equipment, scaled by total assets in year t-1. ∆REV-∆AR is the change in sales minus the change in accounts receivable, scaled by total assets in year t-1. All other control variables are defined in Appendix. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at country level. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses:  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
